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Abstract
Gossip protocols have proved to be a viable solution to set-up and manage large-
scale P2P services or applications in a fully decentralised scenario.
The gossip or epidemic communication scheme is heavily based on stochastic
behaviors and it is the fundamental idea behind many large-scale P2P protocols.
It provides many remarkable features, such as scalability, robustness to failures,
emergent load balancing capabilities, fast spreading, and redundancy of informa-
tion. In some sense, these services or protocols mimic natural system behaviors
in order to achieve their goals.
The key idea of this work is that the remarkable properties of gossip hold
when all the participants follow the rules dictated by the actual protocols. If one
or more malicious nodes join the network and start cheating according to some
strategy, the result can be catastrophic.
In order to study how serious the threat posed by malicious nodes can be
and what can be done to prevent attackers from cheating, we focused on a gen-
eral attack model aimed to defeat a key service in gossip overlay networks (the
Peer Sampling Service [JGKvS04]). We also focused on the problem of protecting
against forged information exchanged in gossip services.
We propose a solution technique for each problem; both techniques are gen-
eral enough to be applied to distinct service implementations. As gossip proto-
cols, our solutions are based on stochastic behavior and are fully decentralized.
v
In addition, each technique’s behaviour is abstracted by a general primitive func-
tion extending the basic gossip scheme; this approach allows the adoptions of our
solutions with minimal changes in different scenarios.
We provide an extensive experimental evaluation to support the effectiveness
of our techniques. Basically, these techniques aim to be building blocks or P2P
architecture guidelines in building more resilient and more secure P2P services.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This work aims to study the effect that malicious attacks can have on a gossip-
based networks. In particular, we first concentrate on a generic attack model
designed to defeat a very fundamental service, the Peer Sampling Service (PSS),
in gossip-based networks. In brief, the PSS is a topology manager that builds and
maintains by gossiping a random graph-like overlay. The overlay is continuously
rewired over time and therefore each node has a fresh, random sample of other
node references stored in its local cache. The PSS ensures strong connectivity and
a high resilience to benign failures (crashes).
The contribution of this thesis is then to show how the aforementioned service
can be easily damaged or defeated and how this threat can also affect other ser-
vices relying on the PSS. Then, we propose a general solution to counter-measure
the attack and to limit the damages to a negligible level. Secondly, we propose an
efficient technique targeting a certain class of protocols relying on the PSS. This
technique is aimed at preventing the diffusion of forged information bymalicious
attackers on behalf of well-behaving peers.
The motivations of this work are summarised as follows.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Motivations
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the area of application-layer
overlay protocols and peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. Examples include popular
file-sharing applications [Gnu, kaz, The, bit], information dissemination [JGJ+00,
CRSZ01, EGKM04b, EGH+03], multimedia streaming applications [CDK+03, KRAV03]
as well as publish/subscribe systems [CRW01, CDKR02, PB02].
The interest towards the P2P paradigm is motivated by its intrinsic decen-
tralisation; informally, the P2P paradigm has introduced a sort of “democracy”
in distributed systems, in which each peer has equal importance. Essentially,
each peer can play both the consumer (client) and the producer (server) of infor-
mation. This idea brings many advantages compared to the classic client-server
paradigm, in which central servers play a substantial role. In fact, the load (mes-
sages) sustained by each peer is in general much lower than the one sustained
by a central server and the failure of any peer is not an issue; therefore, P2P sys-
tems leads to an uniform usage of resources and do not present a single point of
failure.
The interesting features we previously discussed comes at a cost; in general
P2P systems are much harder to design, to deploy and to maintain. P2P systems
are known to be very dynamic: peers join and leave the overlay continuously
(a so called churning process). This dynamism adds further complexity over the
usual client-server model, in which dynamism is restricted to the clients.
The inspiration given by other disciplines (e.g., biology or social science), can
help to achieve the properties needed by P2P systems. In fact, a new “breed”
of algorithms and protocols is growing rapidly. These new protocols are called
epidemic or gossip-based. To communicate in a scalable manner, they mimic how
epidemics spread in natural systems; their behavior is not strictly deterministic,
but relies heavily on stochastic processes.
The communication in P2P systems is performed over an overlay network, su-
perimposed over a routed network, such as the Internet. In order to achieve the
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best possible results and according to the nature of the actual running applica-
tion, the peers are arranged according to a particular overlay-topology. The topol-
ogy provides the relation “who knows whom” and has a crucial impact on the
performance of an application. In addition, each peer can know about only a
small subset of the nodes in the system because of scalability reasons. Distinct
topologies have distinct properties suitable for specific task. We will see a brief
taxonomy in the following section.
The attractive properties of gossip-based protocols we stated previously, are
achieved under the assumption that each peer follows the rules dictated by the
protocol. In fact, it is crucial to note that the robustness to failures and the natu-
ral P2P friendliness to dynamic environment conditions, should not be confused
with resilience to malicious attacks.
Our fundamental question is how do gossip systems react to malicious actions or
attacks? This will be the central focus of our work.
Starting from this generic question, many others arise, such as: how easily
can a network be damaged? What are the consequences of such damage? Do
they lead to transient problems or to more severe problems? What amount of
damage is tolerable by a specific protocol? How long does it take to successfully
perform an attack?
Of course, these questions are indeed very generic, since they depend on the
actual protocol or application under attack and on how the attack is designed and
performed (e.g., the attacker’s goal).
We present a simple example to show that we are not dealing with just an aca-
demic issue, but with a practical problem. To illustrate the problem, consider a
gossiping network in which each node maintains a list of 20 neighbors, called its
partial view (e.g., it provides the relation “who knows whom”). Elements of these
views are continuously updated and exchanged between nodes. Essentially, the
peers are wired in a random graph (topology) fashion with out-degree 20 and
the graph is continuously rewired over time. 20 nodes in the system start behav-
ing maliciously exchanging forged partial views; then, after a short amount of
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time, they leave the network. Figure 1.1(a) shows the overlay in normal condi-
tions; Figure 1.1(b) instead, shows the same graph after the malicious nodes exit:
within a very short time the original overlay is completely disrupted. This exam-
ple refers to a small, 1000 nodes network, but as we show in Chapter 3, no matter
what the size of the network, a successful attack can be carried out swiftly. We
will re-discuss this example with more detail in Chapter 3, when the particular
nature of the gossip protocols involved will be clearly defined.
1.2 Topology taxonomy
As we previously stated, P2P systems build an overlay topology on top of the
usual IP-level network. The overlay plays the important task of ensuring connec-
tivity (e.g., neighbors to contact over the overlay) to the system nodes; in general,
due to the massive size a P2P system can reach, each participant can know about
only a small subset of the overlay, which we refer to as its neighborhood. Usually,
the size of the neighborhood is fixed.
Informally, the topology tells us how the nodes are wired together. The ac-
tual wiring rule may vary depending on the goals to achieve (e.g., file sharing,
searching, multimedia streaming, etc.). The topology may thus be a fundamental
design choice to efficiently perform a certain function.
Essentially, the distributed systems literature distinguishes between twomain
overlay network classes: structured and unstructured. In the former class, nodes
are organised in hierarchical structures that can grow or shrink according to strict
mathematical organisation rules; it is essentially composed by Distributed Hash
Tables (DHT) such as Chord [DBK+01], Pastry [RD01, fre], CAN [RFH+01] or other
derivatives. As conventional hash tables, DHTs provide an efficient distributed
solution for storing and retrieving items. They are suited to store items that can be
mapped to a unique key value (e.g, the hash value of a file name in a file sharing
scenario).
In the latter class, the rule used to build the actual overlay encourages the
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emergence of a (pseudo) random graph. This kind of approach has scalability
problems [JAB01] for some kinds of tasks (e.g., locating resources)due to the ten-
dency to flood the overlaywith queries, but it hasminimalmaintenance overhead
in comparison to the structured approach.
Our simple taxonomy also include superpeer topologies [Mon04, JMB06], but
as a sub category of structured overlays. This third kind of topology is motivated
by the fact that original P2P systems were based on a complete “democracy”
among nodes: “everyone is a peer”. But physical hosts running P2P software
are usually very heterogeneous in terms of computing, storage and communica-
tion resources, ranging from high-end servers to low-end desktop machines. The
superpeer topology addresses this fact and assigns to the most powerful nodes
(according to some rule or to their actual resources) some extra tasks or server
capabilities (e.g., indexing or query routing) for other (weaker) nodes. Recent
versions of the Gnutella [Gnu] file sharing software and Kazaa [kaz] have been
the first examples of such approaches available to the public. The Skype [Sky]
IP-telephony software is claimed to use the same kind of topology. However, this
topology flavour is usually considered as structured.
The topology management protocol is the application or protocol suite compo-
nent that maintains the topological properties of the overlay. These properties
must hold in a real-world P2P scenario, such as when nodes continuously join
and leave the system (churning) and when crashes occur. Other issues can com-
plicate further the situation, such as the coexistence of multiple versions of the
same software.
It is clear that the efficiency and the ratio of successful operations performed
by an application heavily relies on topology management. If the topology is
subverted, the topology manager should be able to recover its structure as, the
topology is only perception of the environment from a peer point of view. A wrong
perception of the environment may have severe consequences.
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.2.1 Basic requirements for topology management
In order to study the effect of malicious attacks we need to identify a basic core
functionality among gossip-based protocols. We need a simple and manageable,
but still realistic common denominator to work with.
We decided to dedicate our attention to the unstructured approach, because
much of the attention of the literature has been focused on structured security
approaches and because in [DKK+05] the authors suggest that unstructured sys-
tems are more vulnerable than DHTs.
The first action a peer must accomplish to enter in a P2P system is joining
the desired overlay. The first step needed by a peer is obtaining a neighborhood
list; for example, the first time a Skype [Sky, BS06] application runs, it asks for
a neighbor list to one randomly chosen server (a high availability Skype node)
among a fixed, pre-assigned set. This node will provide a fresh list of available
Skype nodes to the newcomer. When the newcomer leaves (voluntarily) the sys-
tem, he saves his last neighborhood list to reuse it next time.
The need to set up a reliable neighborhood for reliable connectivity is a primary
concern not only for Skype software, but for any P2P system.
Basically, the connectivity concept (e.g., the nodes’ capacity to interact together
in the overlay) is given by the combination of the network routing facility and the
overlay neighborhood. This functionality can be achievedwith distinct strategies,
but it is always the first step to accomplish.
The connectivity properties are directly related to the actual graph structure
characteristics (degree, clustering coefficient, average path length, etc.).
We have identified a particular service, the Peer Sampling Service (PSS) [JGKvS04]
as a gossip-based facility that provides strong connectivity. This service provides
each node with a list of neighbors picked from the current network population;
the list changes at regular time intervals. The neighbors in its list appear as a
uniform random sample of the current network participants.
When designing gossip-based protocols, the PSS is a valuable component as
it provides any node with random neighbor selection facility and connectivity
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(neighborhood list). In fact, many other gossip protocols are explicitly based on
its presence [JMB05, JB05, VGvS05, Mon04, JMB06, CJ05].
The PSS has a family of distinct fully decentralised implementations [JKvS03,
VGvS05]. All implementations share the fact that nodes are arranged in a random
graph-like fashion. In other words, the PSS graph shares the same important
properties of a random graph (e.g., strong network connectivity, low clustering
of nodes, uniform node degree distribution). This ensures robustness to benign
failures and a fast spreading of the information through the overlay.
As in the vast majority of P2P protocols, the PSS relies on the assumption that
all the participants follow the rules dictated by the protocol. No explicit trust or
securitymeasures are adopted. Wewill show that poisoning the PSS functionality
can have a dramatic effect on the whole P2P system.
We adopt the PSS to test the effect of malicious behavior in P2P gossiping
environments. In fact, attacking the PSS would cause not only trouble to the PSS
itself, but also to the services that rely on it.
1.3 Cheating and attack principles
It is unfeasible to define secure solutions for a service without defining which are
the threats we intend to address.
As a first constraint, we consider that cheating techniques or attacks are based
onmessage exchange of malicious information aimed to trigger some unexpected
side effect in well-behaving peers. Essentially, any malicious action is performed
at the overlay level only.
The goal and the nature of an attack in a P2P gossip network can be similar
to the standard counterpart for traditional distributed systems. In a denial of
service (DOS) attack for example, an attacker may try to overload one or more
target nodes in order to defeat them. This scenario may happen in a malicious
DHT in which ordinary nodes, cheated by an attacker, can forward any message
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to the victim(s). Essentially, a non negligible number of nodes start behaving
maliciously without the voluntary intention of being malicious (see Chapter 7).
We consider that an attacker can basically aspire to two distinct goals: (i)
achieving an advantage at the expense of the rest of the system or (ii) achieving a
massive DOS leading to the overlay destruction.
The former behavior is highly dependent on the nature of the actual running
application, as the concept of “advantage” can assume many distinct meanings.
In a resource-sharing application for example, it is the equivalent of free-riding1.
In other contexts, the attackers may be interested in obtaining a leader position
in the underlying topology; this position may help a higher-layer application to
spread their information messages faster, while dropping potential competitor
messages. It is important to note that, in a healthy gossip overlay, the message drop
performed by few attackers would have no effect because of the high degree of the
overlay graph. The high degree provides redundancy in the spreading of the
information. This fact emphasises the importance of securing the lower connec-
tivity layer.
In the context of the scenario we are modeling, both attacker’s goals can be
achieved by modifying the current PSS topology. By gossiping malicious infor-
mation, the attackers can silently modify the relation “who knows whom” in or-
der to acquire an advantage for their upper level services (or protocols) or to
destroy the network.
To complicate further the scenario, the attackers may run not only malicious
PSS instances, but also malicious upper-level services.
The attack model we are going to present is Chapter 3 can affect also the pro-
tocol layers relying on the PSS, but of course securing the PSS is insufficient to
secure the other layers. Essentially, securing the PSS means ensuring that the ba-
sic connectivity layer has the topology that a regular PSS is supposed to have (or
maintaining the PSS topological properties).
1When free-riding, a node tries to consume as much resources as he can, but without sharing
its own resources.
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Other services distinct from topology managers, but relying on the PSS, may
use it to gossip maliciously forged information as well. The effect of the attack-
ers may vary, but for example, in an advertisement distribution application the
attackers may spread their advertisement, while forging the other peer adver-
tisements in order to make the latter much less interesting than the former. In
Chapter 5, we propose an efficient technique to detect and limit to a minimum
the spreading of this kind of forged information. Securing higher layers involves
a totally different approach than securing the PSS.
1.4 Roadmap
The central focus of this thesis is the design of fully decentralised techniques and
components for secure gossiping. In particular, our aim is to prevent a generic
attack that mutates and possibly destroys the overlay-level topology provided by
a PSS.
Along the way, we describe the attack model and we show its effectiveness
against P2P systems. Then we present our attack countermeasure and another
component aimed at preventing the spreading of forged information.
The remainder of this work is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2: we provide an overview of the PSS motivations and properties.
Two distinct PSS implementations are briefly described; these implementa-
tions have been adopted for our work on gossip security.
• Chapter 3: we introduce our generic attack model, the “hub attack”; we
motivate its novelty and real-world relevance in the P2P area. We present
experimental results, obtained by extensive simulations, supporting our
claim.
• Chapter 4: we present how the hub attack affects other gossip protocols
relying on the PSS. In particular, we present and describe three distinct
gossip protocols and we test the impact of having a poisoned PSS for such
10 Chapter 1. Introduction
protocols. Then, due to the generality of our attack model, we test directly
the effect of the attack over the protocols themselves instead of poisoning
the PSS layer.
• Chapter 5: we present our first secure gossiping component, the SPSS, to
prevent the hub attack and we perform an extensive analysis. The analysis
reveals the efficiency of the solution and its independence from the actual
PSS implementation. Our solution requires the presence of one or more
trusted nodes for maximum security (e.g., used between several organi-
sations) or can be configured in a fully distributed fashion for maximum
scalability.
• Chapter 6: since the SPSS focuses on securing the lower overlay manage-
ment layer, we introduce another technique that allows a node to detect any
forged information item and to ban the malicious sender. The information
items can be spread by a generic gossip spreading protocol. Again, we sup-
port our claims with extensive simulation results.
• Chapter 7: we discuss the current existing attacks and cheating techniques
and their respective solutions, if any.
• Chapter 8: we summarise our main contributions and we discuss future
research.
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(a) A healthy random graph topology
(b) The previous random graph after an attack
Figure 1.1: Overlay mesh status before and after a simple attack: the random
graph depicted in (a) becomes fully disconnected. The graph out-degree (con-
stant) is set to 20, but only 3 links per node are printed. Less than 20 gossiping
cycles are required to disrupt the graph. Network size is 1000 nodes.
Chapter 2
The Peer Sampling Service
In this chapter we introduce the reader to the Peer Sampling Service (PSS). We
address its motivations, characteristics and we briefly review two specific imple-
mentations. We also describe the general system model in which we operate.
2.1 Introduction to the PSS
The gossip based communication model in large-scale distributed systems has
been successfully applied in many areas, such as: information dissemination
[EGKM04a], aggregation [JM04, JMB05], load balancing [JMB04] and synchro-
nisation [MJB04].
The common key point of these approaches is that, periodically, every node in
the system performs an information exchange with some of its peers. The under-
lying service that provides each need with a list of other peers is a fundamental
component for these kind of systems. In general, this service is usually referred
as the Peer Sampling Service (PSS) [JGKvS04] and it is assumed to be implemented
in such a way that any node can exchange information with uniformly random
selected peers; these peers are selected among all the currently available partici-
pants in the network.
To achieve this random selection assumption, some implementers proposed a
solutionwhere every node knows all the other participants in the system [KMG03].
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do forever
wait(∆t)
neighbour = SELECTPEER()
SENDSTATE(neighbour)
n state = RECEIVESTATE()
my state.UPDATE(n state)
do forever
n state = RECEIVESTATE()
SENDSTATE(n state.sender)
my state.UPDATE(n state)
(a) Active Thread (b) Passive Thread
Figure 2.1: The epidemic or gossip paradigm.
In other words, each node maintains a dynamic list of nodes, usually called view
or cache, which can grow with the size of the system. The maintenance cost of
this structure is non negligible, especially in a dynamic system where nodes can
join or leave at any time. For modern hardware, the memory footprint of this
approach is not the main concern, but the quality of the information stored in the
lists becomes problematic. It is interesting to note that while gossip systems are
known to be scalable, the PSS implementation on which they are based may not.
A better idea to build scalable PSS implementations is to use the gossip-based
paradigm, depicted in Figure 2.1, to diffuse the membership information, while
keeping constant in size each peer’s local list of nodes. The continuos gossip
of the membership information enables the emergence of dynamic, unstructured
overlay networks that express the dynamic nature of P2P systems. In addition,
the overlay dynamism ensures good connectivity when nodes crash or discon-
nect.
The very generic nature of the gossip paradigm allows the existence of many
variants of the membership dissemination strategy.
In [JGKvS04], the authors presents a taxonomy of possible PSS implemen-
tations according to three criterions: (i) peer selection (ps), (ii) cache selection
(cs) and (iii) cache propagation (cp). These criterions correspond to distinct im-
plementation behaviours of the SELECTPEER(), RECEIVESTATE() / SEND-
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Peer selection (ps)
random Uniformly random selection of a node from the node’s local
cache
head Select the first node in the local cache
tail Select the last node in the local cache
Cache selection (cs)
random Uniformly random selection of c nodes without replacement
from the (local) cache
head Select the first c nodes from the (local) cache
tail Select the last c nodes from the (local) cache
Cache propagation (cp)
push The current node sends its cache to the selected peer
pull The current node asks for the selected peer cache
push-pull Both nodes exchange their caches
Table 2.1: Distinct behaviours for each considered feature. A short, semantic
explanation is given for each option. These options lead to 27 distinct PSS imple-
mentations.
STATE() 1 and UPDATE() methods. In Table 2.1 is shown the semantic of the
considered options for each method. These options lead to 27 distinct PSS im-
plementations; each one can be represented by the following tuple: (ps, cs, cp),
where each element represents one of the three possible options for the corre-
sponding policy.
The PSS API also requires the presence of an INIT() method (not shown in
Figure 2.1). This method is responsible for node’s cache initialisation; in other
words, it has to bootstrap the node by filling its cache with (valid) node references.
The bootstrapping problem can be solved by out-of-band techniques, for example
1The method signature refers to a generic “state” entity, but the actual information exchanged
is the node’s cache.
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using a set of well-known nodes or a central service publishing node identifiers.
Essentially, these are the approaches adopted by some well known P2P applica-
tion, such as Skype [Sky] or many Gnutella [Gnu] clients.
The authors define an experimental methodology to evaluate these distinct
protocols. The methodology focuses on the emergent overlay induced by the
gossip interactions among peers. In particular, the convergence to the desirable
uniform random model has been evaluated; other graph-like properties (e.g., the
degree distribution, the average path length and the clustering coefficient) and
the system reliability, in terms of self-healing, have been checked.
The key aspect highlighted by the evaluation is that the examined protocols,
sharing the feature of building an unstructured overlay using partial views, can
lead to different emergent overlays, none of which resembles a random graph. In-
stead, the overlays seems to belong to the family of small-world graphs, in which a
small diameter and a large clustering are the typical characteristics.
However, whether from a system-wide point of view the overlay is far from
being a random graph, from a node’s point of view instead, the peer selection
from the local cache can still be considered (almost) random. This property is a
cornerstone for many gossip protocols and, in particular, for the protocols dis-
cussed in this work (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
We considered two distinct PSS implementations called NEWSCAST and basic-
shuffling. Both are heavily inspired by the prototypal gossip scheme depicted
in Figure 2.1, and, using the tuple notation, they correspond to ( random, head,
push-pull ) and ( random, random, push-pull ) respectively. We obtained similar
results with both implementations. Before introducing our attack model in the
next chapter, we provide our general system model and a background of these
implementations.
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2.2 System model
The system model presented in this section holds in all the other sections of this
work; it will be incrementally extended when required by the introduction of a
specific protocol.
We consider a network consisting of a large collection of nodes that can join or
leave at any time. Leaving the network can be voluntary or due to a crash. We
assume the presence of a routed network (e.g., the Internet) in which any node
can, in principle, contact any other party.
Any node in the network must be addressable by a unique node identifier (ID),
such as an 〈IP-address, port〉 pair. Notice that we have chosen this simple form
of ID as a more sophisticated one would add unnecessary details to our general
model. However, an ID suitable for a real-world protocol must address many
issues. For example, a single host may run several instances of an application
under distinct user’s domains and hence the IDmust distinguish among different
instances and users. A further complication is represented by the presence of
firewalls between peers and by NAT routing. These issues suggest that a real ID
is a complex structure and needs a careful design.
Because of scalability constraints, a node knows about only a small subset of
other nodes. This subset, which may change, is stored in a local cache, while the
node IDs it holds are called neighbors. This set provides the connectivity for a
node in the overlay; the absence of items in this set or the presence of incorrect
or bogus IDs leads to an unrecoverable situation. In this case, a new initialisation
or bootstrap is required. In general, P2P applications provide a set of well-known,
highly available nodes in order to be used as a bootstrap facility and hence as the
initial neighborhood set.
In the cache, a timestamp is associated with each distinct node ID in order to
eventually purge “old” ID references according to an ageing policy [JKvS03].
The notion of time in our model is not strict because our gossip protocols need
not be synchronised. Wemeasure time in generic time units or cycles during which
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each node has the possibility to initiate a gossip exchange with another randomly
selected node from its local cache.
We use the following terminology: the pollution is the presence of IDs of mali-
cious nodes in a peer’s cache. A node is defeated if all the entries in its cache refer to
malicious nodes (i.e., 100% polluted) and an overlay is defeated or destroyed if every
node in the overlay is defeated, or in other words, if it is completely partitioned
(e.g., each peer has no more neighbors).
2.2.1 PSS implementation: Newscast
Newscast [JKvS03] is a gossip-based protocol that builds and maintains a contin-
uously changing random graph (or overlay). The generated topology is very sta-
ble and provides robust connectivity. This protocol has been a successful building
block to implement several P2P protocols [JMB05, JB05, CJ05]. The NEWSCAST im-
plementation of the PSS corresponds to the ( random, head, push-pull ) tuple, using
the notation introduced in Section 2.1.
In NEWSCAST, each node maintains a cache containing c IDs extended with a
logical timestamp (ts) representing its creation time. The protocol behavior fol-
lows strictly the gossip scheme; periodically, a node A does the following: (i) it
selects a random peer B from its local cache; (ii) then updates its local timestamp;
and (iii) performs a cache exchange with B. The exchange involves sending A’s
cache along with its own ID and receiving B’s cache and ID.
After the exchange, each party merges the received cache with its current one
and keeps the c “freshest” IDs as measured by the timestamp associated with
each ID. No multiple copies of the same ID in a single cache are allowed. Each
peer always puts the other party’s ID in first position in its own cache after the
exchange. This sequence of actions is depicted in Figure 2.2.
This exchange mechanism has three effects:
1. caches are continuously shuffled, creating a topology with a low diameter
that is close to a random graph with out-degree c. Experimental results (see
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F/5 D/5 O/5 I/5 J/4
C/5 E/5 B/5 W/4 H/4 A/6F/5 D/5 O/5 I/5 J/4 B/6
C/5 E/5 B/5 W/4 H/4
B/6 E/5 C/5 I/5 O/5 F/5 D/5 H/4 W/4 J/4 A/6 E/5 C/5 I/5 O/5 F/5 D/5 H/4 W/4 J/4
New view
Node BNode A
2. Update 2. Update
New view
1. Exchange
Current viewCurrent view
Figure 2.2: A NEWSCAST gossip-exchange between node A and B. Cache size
c = 5. An ID is represented by a capital letter along with its timestamp. The
exchange time is cycle 6.
[JKvS03]) proved that a small 20 elements local cache is already sufficient
for a very stable and robust connectivity.
2. the resulting topology is strongly connected.
3. the overlay is self-repairing, since crashed nodes cannot inject new descrip-
tors any more, so their information quickly disappears from the system be-
cause of the timestamp ageing policy.
Newscast is also cheap in terms of network communication. The traffic gen-
erated by the protocol is estimated in [JKvS03]. Summarising very briefly, the
number of exchanges per cycle can be modelled by the random variable 1+φ,
where φ has a Poisson distribution with parameter 1. Thus, on average, we ex-
pect two exchanges per cycle (one active and one passive, see Figure 2.1). This
involves the exchange of a few hundred bytes per cycle for each peer.
2.2.2 PSS implementation: basic-shuffling
The basic shuffling is the foundation algorithm of the more sophisticated Cy-
clon [VGvS05] protocol. The basic-shuffling implementation of the PSS corre-
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sponds to the ( random, random, push-pull ) tuple, using the notation introduced in
Section 2.1.
Wewill be brief about the protocol and, for any further detail, refer to [VGvS05].
Each peer P periodically performs the following steps:
1. select a random, non-empty subset of l node IDs from its cache, where l is
a system wide parameter; then pick a random neighbor Q from this set
2. replace Q ID with P’s ID
3. send the updated subset to Q
4. receive from Q a subset (6= ∅) of no more than l ID entries regarding Q’s
neighbors
5. discard entries pointing to P and any entry already in P’s cache
6. update P’s cache to include all remaining entries, by firstly using empty
cache slots (if any), and secondly replacing entries among the ones origi-
nally sent to Q
When Q receives an exchange request, it randomly selects a subset of its own
neighbors, of size no more than l, sends it to the initiating node (P), and executes
steps 5 and 6 to update its own cache accordingly.
In contrast to NEWSCAST, the topology emerged by basic-shuffling exhibits
a lower clustering coefficient, resulting in a mesh closer to a real random graph.
However, a drawback is the longer time required to purge the IDs of nodes which
have left the network.
Chapter 3
Attack model and analysis
In this chapter we introduce our attack model. We show its effectiveness in de-
stroying or causing other severe damages to the Peer Sampling Service (PSS) over-
lay.
Before dealing with the details of the attack and introducing our attack model,
we first start with an example scenario we have already seen briefly in Section 1.1.
Then, we describe the actual strategy and algorithm played by the attackers and
we evaluate the effects of the attack over the PSS topology. In this chapter, we do
not adopt any countermeasure against the attack.
3.1 Attack scenario
Figure 3.1 shows the impact that our attackmodel can have on a network, in order
to give a quick understanding of its relevance. The attack leads to a completely
partitioned network. The time require to achieve this massive (DOS) destruction
is just less than 20 cycles. The network size is 1,000 nodes, but the same result
holds for larger networks (see Section 3.3).
In this scenario, the cache size is set to 20 IDs, as well as the number of ma-
licious nodes in the system. Malicious nodes know each other and execute the
standard PSS algorithm, NEWSCAST in this particular scenario. However, when
a malicious node initiates a gossip exchange, it fills its cache with the IDs of the
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Figure 3.1: Overlay mesh status after a hub-attack: each node is fully discon-
nected. The PSS cache size is fixed to 20 IDs. Less than 20 gossiping cycles are
required to disrupt the PSS. Network size is 1000 nodes.
other malicious nodes. In addition, it forges each ID by giving it a fresh time-
stamp. A malicious node always provides this information to a non-malicious
node. As a consequence of using fresh timestamps, the latter will always replace
its entire cache with the one sent by the malicious node, effectively immediately
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isolating it from other non-malicious nodes, at which point it is defeated.
Only a nondefeated, nonmalicious node B can help a defeated one, sayA, pro-
vided B has A’s ID in its local cache. However, when B contacts A, we can expect
that after the exchange half of the local caches of A and B, respectively, will be
polluted with IDs of malicious nodes. As a consequence, there is a 50% chance
that each will contact such a node, in turn, being defeated. But even contacting
a nonmalicious node will generally also spread the pollution and increase the
chance that a nondefeated node contacts a malicious one. The pollution and de-
feat of nodes spreads very fast, completely in accordance to what can be expected
from a gossiping protocol.
There is no way for a nonmalicious node to identify a malicious one as they
seem to play fairly; however, as the attackers always pass on the same cache, it
is easy for any node to keep track of the last cache provided by a neighbor in
order to detect the malicious nodes. Sadly, when a non-malicious node detects
the bogus cache replayed by the same neighbor, it is too late to react since the
node cache is completely filled with malicious IDs.
In less than 20 cycles, all nonmalicious peers have their cache completely pol-
luted and become defeated. At that point, the malicious nodes may decide to
leave the network, leaving it in completely disrupted state without any hope of
recovery. It is interesting to note that many gossiping protocols may easily suffer
from such an attack. In fact, many distinct gossip protocols differ in just a few de-
tails. For example, QuickPeer [CJ05] (a T-Man [JB05] family protocol) may suffer
as well.
In this sense, it is somewhat surprising to see how little attention this topic
has yet received.
3.2 Attack model
In the following, we will define in detail a generic attack model that is independent
of specific PSS implementations. The attackers purposefully deviate from the
Chapter 3. Attack model and analysis 23
standard PSS protocol in order to disrupt the service. The reason for doing so
can range from obtaining a leader position in order to manipulate applications
relying on the PSS, to conducting amassive DOS attack as described in Section 3.1.
In both cases, the main objective of an attacker is to destroy the well-formed
peer network topology and cause the formation of a hub set of attackers over
which all peers are linked. For example, a successful single attacker can subvert
the peer network topology to a star topology with itself as the hub. We decided
to promote the formation of k > 0 hubs, because it allows the attackers to achieve
a strategic control position over the network. Essentially, on the one hand a star
topology still ensures connectivity of the overlay graph, while being robust to
random failures. On the other hand, it is completely dependent on (vulnerable
to) plans of the attackers; the hub topology fulfils the goals sketched in Section
1.3.
The principal method of attack in our generic attack model is injection of fab-
ricated data through the messages gossiped among the participants resulting in
the pollution of local caches, which induce the structure of the topology.
Our attack model expects the attackers to operate intelligently and not allow
themselves to be trivially exposed as the sources of cache pollution. Therefore,
the attackers will operate in such a manner so as to be indistinguishable from
well-behaved peers under standard operating conditions. While the goal and
principal method of attack are generic, actual attacks may use features specific to
a particular protocol implementation.
In this setting, the set of actions that an attacker may carry out are as follows:
• Dropping of identifiers: attackers may maliciously drop node references
from their caches. However, this attack does not pose a serious threat to the
peer network whether attackers select dropped references randomly or in
collusion with other attackers. The resilience of the peer network to this at-
tack is due to the gossiping scheme used for communication that provides
inherent redundancy to the system. As the neighborhood set for each node
24 Chapter 3. Attack model and analysis
continuously changes, an attacker cannot prevent its neighbors from receiv-
ing a node reference for more than one cycle.
• Replay of identifiers: an attacker can violate protocol-specific constraints
(e.g., timestamped-related rules for identifiers in NEWSCAST) in the mes-
sage exchanges of node references and attempt to diffuse invalid informa-
tion throughout the overlay. However, this attack also cannot cause serious
damage to the network due to reasons given earlier for dropped identifiers
attack.
• Corruption of identifiers: an attacker may corrupt node identifiers (IDs)
to influence maliciously the operation of the specific PSS implementation.
The attacker may corrupt selected elements of an ID to achieve a specific
anomalous behavior of the protocol. This is a serious attack as gossiping
protocols can diffuse these corrupt identifiers rapidly throughout the over-
lay thus potentially leading to a massive denial-of-service (DOS) attack.
• Forging of identifiers: an attacker forges one or more node references to in-
sert into its cache. The difference among the previous kind of action is that
the ID is created from scratch, while in the previous case the ID is modified
according to a malicious intent. These identifiers could be of actual nodes of
the PSS nodes that are other attackers, nodes that are present but not part
of the PSS or even fake nodes that do not exist in the overlay. Although
the semantics of a PSS require that exchanged caches must contain distinct
IDs, such rules are of no use in the absence of active checks on peers (such as
pinging to detect liveness). This is a serious attack as well, as gossiping pro-
tocols can diffuse these corrupt identifiers rapidly throughout the overlay
thus potentially leading to a massive denial-of-service (DOS) attack.
Because of the highly dynamic nature of a PSS the above actions will not cause
a serious disruption to the overlay if they are carried out occasionally by a few
attackers. While a large number of attackers can destroy the topology with any of
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the above attacks, the presence of such a large number of attackers is an unlikely
attack scenario. Instead, we consider a practical attack scenario in which there
are k malicious peers attacking a PSS with a cache size of c where k ≤ c. We
consider very difficult for an attacker to acquire distinct fake identities, therefore
we exclude the threat of a Sybil [Dou02] attack in our model.
Our attack algorithm, which we call the hub attack, uses a combination of replay
and forgery attacks simultaneously.
We consider the attack scenario in which attackers can cause maximum dam-
age to the peer network utilising theminimum amount of resources for the attack.
For this, we assume that malicious peers collude and co-operate. However, this
assumption can be removed without any effect on the attack algorithm as it af-
fects only the time needed to complete the attack and not its outcome.
3.2.1 Hub attack algorithm
The basic idea to always replay a message holding the forged ID’s of the other
malicious peers in the network is perfectly valid from a PSS point of view, as the
only mandatory constraint is that cache entries must be distinct. This intrinsic
weak constraint complies to reality. For example, in real world P2P file sharing
[LNR06, NCW05, RD01], when a peer receives an advertisement for an item, the
peer does not check whether the item is available at the advertised location or
not; as noted earlier, this allows a malicious peer to appear exactly as any other
peer in the network and not arouse suspicions on its behavior.
In the hub attack, each malicious peer maintains a STEALTHCACHE structure in
which it collects the IDs of well-behaved peers only. This hidden cache structure
has no size limit and it is allowed, if necessary, to grow to the size of the net-
work. The STEALTHCACHE is initialised with the IDs in the public standard PSS
cache at the start of the attack. Then the attacker runs the standard PSS algorithm
but with maliciously created messages that contain the IDs of all the other mali-
cious peers. The neighbor nodes to exchange these messages are picked from the
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STEALTHCACHE. The hub attack algorithm executed by a malicious peer Pm is as
follows:
1. Pm pollutes its cache with the IDs of other malicious peers and its own ID. If
k < c then Pm fills the remaining entries with nonmalicious IDs taken from
its STEALTHCACHE.
2. Pm next executes the standard PSS algorithm but randomly selects a non-
malicious neighbor (Pn) from the STEALTHCACHE.
3. Pm receives the cache of Pn and stores the records in its STEALTHCACHE.
While malicious peers execute the hub attack algorithm, the nonmalicious
peers execute the standard PSS algorithm in each cycle. In the above algorithm,
a Pmwill pollute its cache with other malicious peer IDs (MN variant). A variant
of the hub attack algorithm has Pm fill up its cache with randomly generated fake
IDs (FN variant) when k < c.
After executing the algorithm sufficiently for long (e.g., 20-30 gossip rounds
in practice), the malicious peers will have formed a hub topology, and effectively
now control the network. At that point, different scenarios are possible, including
the control of higher level applications, and complete disruption of the PSS by
exiting the network.
3.3 Attack evaluation
To validate the effectiveness of our hub attack algorithm described in Section 3.2,
we performed a large number of simulation experiments with two goals: (1) to
measure the speed of convergence of the network to a destroyed overlay topology
and (2) to measure the extent of the damage according to the number of emergent
clusters and the percentage of nodes residing outside the main cluster.
The simulations were done on three different overlay sizes of 1,000, 5,000 and
10,000 nodes with the number of malicious peers k ranging from 10 to 20 for a
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(c) 18 malicious nodes (d) 20 malicious nodes
Figure 3.2: Overlay mesh status after a hub-attack (MN variant). The PSS cache
size is fixed to 20 IDs. When k = c (see 3.2(d)), each node is fully disconnected.
Less than 20 gossiping cycles are required to disrupt the PSS. Network size is
1000 nodes.
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PSS cache size c set at 20 entries. In the evaluation, we consider both NEWSCAST
and basic-shuffling implementations of the PSS. In order to achieve a fair com-
parison among them, we set l = c in the case of basic shuffling (see Section 2.2.2);
in this manner, the amount of information exchanged is equal at each cycle for
both implementations. All the individual results described are averaged over 10
separate experiments.
The effects of our hub attack on a 1,000 node overlay are shown in the se-
quence of images in Figure 3.2. The images from left to right show the increasing
damage to the overlay as a function of the number of malicious peers involved
(respectively 14, 16, 18 and 20). Each image has been taken just after the exit of
malicious peers from the network. As shown in the rightmost image, when k = c,
the network is completely partitioned. As already discussed in Section 3.1, now
for each remaining node, all its neighbors were the malicious peers that no longer
exist in the network.
Even for hub attack scenarios where the number of malicious peers are less
than the cache size (e.g., 70-75%), the overlay is still severely damaged as can be
seen in Figure 3.2(b) with the network partitioned into many distinct clusters. As
the PSS is incapable ofmerging clusters together, recovery of the network requires
a reboot process that will restore a random wiring among the clusters after a few
cycles.
The emergence of clusters when the caches are polluted to 70-65% of their ca-
pacity with malicious peers IDs is shown in Figure 3.3(a). A cache pollution per-
centage lower than these values leads to a single, very large and highly clustered
component. For this kind of damage, the standard PSS can restore the original
topology in a short amount of time. Thus, the hub attack in this case is not very
serious with only a transient damage and the result holds for any network size.
The simulation results also confirm that when k = c, the number of clusters is
equal to the actual network size. When the number of malicious peers k is closer
to the cache size c, say 18 − 20, then the number of nodes that are located out-
side the main cluster decreases almost exponentially. This behavior is shown in
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Figure 3.3(b). Figure 3.3(c) shows the important result from our experiments on
network fragmentation due to a hub attack from a different perspective. Once
the small set of malicious peers exit the network, the average size of the biggest
cluster tends to be quite small. This behavior is completely opposite to the effect
of a massive node crash failure in a PSS overlay in which a giant component is
surrounded by few small satellite clusters (see [JGKvS04]).
These results also hold for the basic-shuffling PSS implementation depicted in
Figures 3.3(d), 3.3(e) and 3.3(f). Apart from a small variance in the actual values,
the results are almost coincident.
The graphs in Figure 3.4(a) shows the convergence of the overlay to a com-
pletely destroyed status in terms of the percentage of nodes that become defeated
over time. The smaller 1,000 node network converges rapidly as the cache size of
20 is comparatively large for such a small network. However, the larger overlays
also becomes completely destroyed in less than 45 cycles. Note that the y-axis
percentage of defeated nodes does not reach 100% as the node count includes the
malicious peers also.
However, the FN variant of the hub attack is much more destructive as it can
destroy the network with just 4 or 5 malicious peers regardless of the network
size or the cache size, as we discuss next. The performance of the FN variant of
the hub attack is summarised in Figure 3.4(b) with the y-axis showing the time
required to destroy the network and the x-axis indicating the network size. Each
line represents a specific number of malicious peers k involved in the attack with
remaining cache entries (c − k) filled with fake IDs. As shown, even with only
four malicious peers, the network can be defeated in 42 cycles for a 10,000 node
network. The differences in time required to defeat the overlay for various net-
work sizes is in general small. Therefore, it can be said that the attack speed is
independent of the network size. However, when we use less than 4 malicious
peers, the time required to defeat the network begins to increase noticeably. For
example, with 2 malicious peers, the time is almost linear to the network size.
The reason for this phenomenon is twofold: (1) the sources of infection become
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limited and (2) the fake IDs polluting the caches have the effect of reducing the
node degree, limiting further chances of contacting a peer and thus slows down
the infected PSS. It is interesting to note that the FN variant of the hub attack is
able to destroy a network using just a single malicious peer; however, the time
needed to complete the attack is too long for it to have any practical impact.
Figure 3.4(c) and 3.4(d) show the same scenario, but using the basic shuffling
PSS implementation. Apart from a very small difference in the convergence speed
(e.g., a few cycles), the observations we made previously still hold. This speed
difference is probably due to the absence of a time-stamps bound to the node IDs
in the basic-shuffling algorithm; this makes the pollution to spread a bit slower,
as the mechanism with which a new ID is collected is random rather than deter-
ministic (e.g., time-stamp based). However, the difference is almost negligible.
It is important to realise that this rapidly spreading attack has a very high in-
fection rate, thus making it extremely difficult for peers to react in time. In other
words, by the time a peer discovers that it is infected, it is already too late to ob-
tain assistance from a neighbor peer, either because the node is already defeated
or its neighbors are too polluted to be of any help.
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Figure 3.3: Cluster emergence after the exit of all malicious peers. The first three
graphs represent the NEWSCAST implementation behaviour, while the others rep-
resents the basic-shuffling implementation.
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Figure 3.4: (a),(c) Convergence to the defeated network using 20 malicious nodes
adopting the MN attack variant; using a number of malicious nodes lower than
the cache size c, the nodes caches cannot be completely polluted and thus, not
even a single node is defeated. The results are shown for NEWSCAST and basic-
shifling respectively. (b), (d) The time required to defeat the network using the FN
attack variant; distinct network sizes are shown and each line represents a specific
number of malicious peers. The results are shown for both PSS implementations.
Chapter 4
Effects on protocols other than the PSS
From the previous chapter, it is clear that the hub attack has a devastating impact
on the PSS and on its crucial functionality.
When the PSS becomes completely partitioned, any protocol relying on the
PSS becomes completely isolated as well. Other protocols instead, using the PSS
as a bootstrap facility to build their own overlay, may have less trouble; however
the lack of the PSS functionality would produce problems in dynamic environ-
ments if, for example, the peers are periodically sampling the network - i.e. using
the PSS - looking for newly joined peers.
Because of these reasons, we still consider the hub attack described in Section
3.2, but the attackers do not leave the network. Essentially, the attackers are inter-
ested in obtaining a leader position to influence and bias the performance or the
behavior of a higher-layer protocol or application.
We consider the hub attack in light of three distinct gossip based protocols: (i)
an aggregation protocol (see Section 4.1), (ii) the QuickPeer protocol (see Section
4.2) and (iii) the SG-2 management protocol for superpeer networks(see Section
4.3).
The motivation for our choice is the following: the first protocol relies com-
pletely on the overlay, provided by the PSS, while the other two are overlay man-
agers protocols; they still rely on the PSS for bootstrapping, locating new nodes
identifiers or diffusing critical information, but they build their own overlay (i.e.,
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the relation “who knows whom”) according to their specific constraints.
In the following sections, we will first describe each protocol along with its
attack scenario.
4.1 Aggregation protocol
Aggregation [JM04] is a family of fast epidemic-style averaging protocols de-
signed to compute any mean function on a numeric value held at each network
node. Essentially, we suppose each node holds a value expressing any relevant
characteristic and all nodes are interested into the global mean of this particular
characteristic.
The mean function must be in the form:
m = f−1
(
f(a1) + . . .+ f(an)
n
)
where f(x) can be:
f(x) = x average
f(x) = x2 quadratic
f(x) = 1
x
harmonic
f(x) = ln x geometric
The averaging protocol can compute any aggregate function expressed as a
function of some means. For example, the variance can be computed using the
average and the average of squares, the network size can be estimated using 1average
and the sum can be obtained using the network size times the average.
Aggregation does not manage the overlay wiring, but every node relies on an
underlying PSS (see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) which provides access to a neigh-
bor list cache. Without imposing any particular requirements about the topology
management protocol.
To understand how the aggregation works, we discuss how to calculate the
averages.
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The basic aggregation behavior fits exactly in the epidemic scheme (see Fig-
ure 2.1). The generic method UPDATE() returns (a+ b)/2, where a and b are the
values held by nodeA and B respectively. This computation step is performed by
each node at regular intervals (at each simulation cycle). The global value aver-
age is not affected, but the variance over all the estimates decreases very quickly
after a few interaction steps; the result is that each node reaches an almost exact
estimate of the average of all the node’s values in the system. The convergence
rate decreases exponentially and it proves also highly scalable, in fact it is almost
independent from the network size.
In addition, the aggregation protocol is also very robust in case of (massive)
node failures. Failures can at most lower the speed of the aggregation process.
As stated in the beginning, an interesting direct consequence of the averaging
function is the ability of estimating the network size. This feature can be useful,
for example, to fine-tune other protocols according to network size. This function
can be achieved using a particular setup at the start of the protocol: essentially,
we need the sum of all node values to be exactly 1. In particular, we can set just
one node to the value 1, while all the others are set to 0. The average is 1/N, thus
N can be extracted directly.
However, it is not easy to set up values in this fashion in a real P2P distributed
system. How to choose the node holding the value 1? Messages can bemarked by
a unique leader ID; only this leader node can set its value to 1. Nodes could also
start multiple aggregation instances to increase the estimation accuracy and each
instance must have its own leader node. Unfortunately, this technique, without
a central service dedicated to the management of the leader nodes election, can
be hardly adopted, as the agreement problem for the leader election is too hard,
especially in a large-scale, dynamic environment.
4.1.1 Aggregation under hub attack
A comparison of the performance of the aggregation protocol under attack is
summarised in Figure 4.1. We used the averaging version of the aggregation
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Figure 4.1: Impact of the hub attack on an aggregation protocol. Network size is
10,000 nodes. Distinct scenarios are compared.
protocol family described in the previous section. We measured the average vari-
ance of the aggregated values over time. The values to be averaged are assigned
to each node by a peak distribution of parameter 10,000 in a bootstrap phase (e.g.,
before running the protocol). The network size is 10,000 nodes.The cache size c is
20.
Essentially, the goal of this aggregation experiment is to obtain a value of 1
(the average value considering the network size and the initialisation values) in
each peer.
The lower line shows the normal behaviour of the aggregation protocol; 20
cycles are sufficient to obtain a negligible difference among the estimates of each
peer. In less than 40 cycles instead, the estimates become all equal.
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The other lines in the plot shows the behavior of aggregation when the un-
derlying PSS is under a hub attack. The attack is started at the beginning of the
simulation, if not specified otherwise.
The next upper line (from the bottom) shows the convergence when the hub
attack is running. In all the attack scenarios of this section, 20 (c = k) malicious
nodes are involved. The effect of the cache pollution is evident. In this particular
case, the accuracy (e.g., the variance of the estimates) of the calculation is toler-
able, but the protocol takes longer and it never reaches the exact value. In other
words, the presence of a poisoned PSS is evident.
As aggregation is usually run at regular intervals (see Section 4.1) to produce
a continuous monitoring process, the aggregation protocol is unlikely to start at
the same time as the hub attack. In fact, the third line from the bottom shows a
slightly different set-up: the aggregation starts when the hub attack has already
polluted 40% of the PSS caches (on average). The effect of a biased topology is
evident and the protocol accuracy is almost stopped in 15 cycles. As soon as the
random graph has turned into a hub topology, the convergence makes no more
progress and the variance of the estimates is still high.
Finally, the upper line shows a scenario in which the malicious nodes run
also a simple, malicious version of the aggregation protocol; these nodes never
average their value and always replay their same value (10,000 in the example).
Essentially, this behavior is an adaptation of the hub attack general model to the
aggregation specific case. The malicious behavior at the attackers is started at
the beginning of the simulation. The convergence diverges in a first phase, then
tends to converge (very) slowly towards 5,000. In fact, when the hub topology
is emerged, every node is connected to a malicious peer and continuously gets
10000 and divides by 2.
The final example gives an idea of what can be done when the attackers ac-
quire first a leader position (e.g., with the hub topology) and simultaneously in-
ject malicious information in the higher level protocol or service. It is interesting
to note that themalicious aggregation behavior would have very little effect with-
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out the presence of the biased topology. The combination of the two approaches
has a devastating impact. In this case, the hub attack opens the road to much
more dangerous attacks and can be seen as a “Trojan horse”.
4.2 QuickPeer protocol
QuickPeer [CJ05] is a latency-aware topology manager targeted to un-structured
networks. Quick-Peer can effectively build and maintain large scale latency-aware
overlay topologies. These topologies reflect the underlying IP-level network topol-
ogy, and provide each peer with the knowledge of the closest (or furthest) neigh-
bor available in the overlay network at a given time, according to network dis-
tance (latency).
There are several works that are similar or at least related with QuickPeer.
T-Man [JB05], for example, is a generic, gossip-based framework for manag-
ing and building large-scale overlay topologies that inspired our work on Quick-
Peer. However, in [JB05], T-Man performance is evaluated only on “geometric”
topologies (e.g., torus, ring or binary tree). In contrast, we evaluate QuickPeer
using more realistic topology models and in dynamic environments to illustrate
QuickPeer’s self-healing and adaptive behavior. Essentially, Quick-Peer can be
considered as an instance protocol in the T-Man framework optimized for prox-
imity topologies using virtual coordinates.
In [RHKS02], the authors propose a scheme to partition overlay nodes into
“bins” according to network proximity information. This information is gathered
from DNS and delay measures against a set of landmark nodes. Our approach, in
contrast, does not need any infrastructure services and exploits a synthetic virtual
coordinates system (VIVALDI [DCKM04]) to obtain distance measurements.
In [DGH+87], the authors propose an epidemic protocol, the Localiser, to opti-
mize an unstructured overlay network built using SCAMP [GKM01]. Such pro-
tocol prove to be scalable and tolerates failures. However, no massive node join
scenarios are evaluated.
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Several architectures for global distance estimation services that exploit syn-
thetic coordinates have been proposed recently. IDMaps [FJJ+99] andGNP [NZ02]
rely on deployment of infrastructure nodes. In contrast, VIVALDI [DCKM04], PIC
[CMAP04] and PCoord [LL04] provide latency estimates using distance measure-
ments gathered only between end hosts in the overlay network. We opted for
VIVALDI because of its fully distributed nature and simple implementation. How-
ever, QuickPeer is not tied to a specific coordinate system and can be used with
any of the systems cited above.
In the followings, we introduce the problem of building the latency-aware
overlay and the QuickPeer protocol. Section 4.2.2 defines the experimental setup
and presents simulation results proving QuickPeer scalability and adaptiveness
to dynamic environmental conditions. Finally, we briefly discuss the protocol
features and in Section 4.2.4 we test the reaction of QuickPeer under the hub
attack.
4.2.1 Latency-aware overlay topology management
System Model In our model, peers communicate via message exchanges, ex-
ploiting the connectivity provided by an underlying routed network (i.e., the In-
ternet). Each peer knows a set of other peers (its neighbors) that define its local
cache. As we consider networks of large size, partial membership information at
each peer is required for scalability and manageability purposes.
Network distance between peers is modeled using the VIVALDI network coor-
dinate system (see [DCKM04]). Each peer in the overlay has an associated node
identifier (ID), e.g. a touple 〈IP address, port, coordinate〉. Due to this simple ID
representation, we assume that peers run on distinct physical hosts (see Section
2.2).
We consider a dynamic overlay network, where peers may join or leave the
network at any time (churning).
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do forever
wait(∆t)
neighbor = SELECTPEER()
SENDSTATE(neighbor)
peer cache = RECEIVESTATE()
my cache.UPDATE(peer cache, trimPolicy)
do forever
peer cache = RECEIVESTATE()
SENDSTATE(peer cache.sender)
my cache.UPDATE(peer cache, trimPolicy)
(a) Active Thread (b) Passive Thread
Figure 4.2: QuickPeer protocol pseudo code. It fits perfectly in the standard gos-
sip scheme, in fact it is almost identical (see Figure 2.1).
The VIVALDI protocol VIVALDI [DCKM04] is a decentralized, scalable, and effi-
cient protocol developed at MIT. Using VIVALDI, nodes may obtain good coordi-
nates with few RTT probes directed to a small subset of nodes. More importantly,
VIVALDI can exploit normal traffic produced by applications using it, without re-
quiring further communication.
The estimate of the latency distance between vi and vj is denoted est(vi, vj).
Being estimates, these values may differ from the actual latency. The pairwise
error between the estimate and the actual latency can be computed as:
| lat(vi, vj) − est(vi, vj)|
min{est(vi, vj), lat(vi, vj)}
where lat(v,w) expresses the latency distance between a pair of nodes (v, w)
and represents the average round-trip time (RTT) experienced by communica-
tions between them.
In our experiments, the number of dimensions of the virtual space is 5; mea-
suring the error between all pairs of nodes, we found a median error of only 0.14,
and a maximum error of 3.5.
The QuickPeer protocol QuickPeer (QP) is an epidemic protocol that, within
few gossip exchanges among the participants, provides each peer with the closest
(or furthest) peer identifiers (IDs) available in the overlay. The basic idea under-
lying the protocol, inspired by the work presented in [JB05], is as follows. Each
peer maintains a fixed-size cache holding k IDs. The cache is sorted according to
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the network distance estimates provided by VIVALDI coordinates. So, at any time,
the first position in the cache holds the closest peer known so far.
At the beginning, QuickPeer caches needs to be initialized with a random
sample of nodes taken from the whole overlay. For this purpose, QuickPeer relies
on a PSS instance [JGKvS04]. We adopted the Newscast protocol [JKvS03] as
a sampling service implementation. Starting from a first random snapshot, QP
basically evolves the initial random overlay towards the desired latency-aware
topology.
In order to evolve the topology, peers exchange caches in an epidemic fashion.
Periodically, each peer actively selects a neighbor and starts a cache exchange
process (see pseudo-code in Figure 4.2). Once the remote peer’s cache has been
received, it is mergedwith the local one. Note that this merge operation preserves
the ordering of the local cache, i.e., newly received IDs are sorted according to the
distance from the local peer coordinates.
After the caches have been merged, a trimming policy selects the k IDs (out
of the possible 2k) that are kept in the local cache. Currently, QP supports two
distinct trimming policies:
1. ClosePolicy(k): selects the first k IDs in the cache (i.e., the closest neighbors
seen so far);
2. CloseFarPolicy(k): selects the first and the last k/2 IDs in the cache (i.e., the
closest and furthest neighbors seen so far).
Merging and trimming operations described above are performed in the UPDATE()
method shown in Figure 4.2.
In contrast to standard epidemic approaches [JKvS03, EGH+03], QuickPeer
randomly picks the neighbor for an exchange only in the first half of the cache
(i.e., among the first k/2 IDs). Experimental results [JB05] show that this strat-
egy leads to faster convergence to a latency-aware optimal overlay. In addition,
QuickPeer lets each node exchange at most once for each gossip round (actively
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or passively). This ensures that, on the average, all peers exchange caches the
same number of times during a QuickPeer session.
Failure detection QuickPeer detects failed nodes at picking time. If a neighbor
selected for the cache exchange does not answer a probe message in a limited
amount of time, it is considered failed and its ID is removed from the cache. In
case of massive node failures, however, the second half of the cache will still be
populated with references to failed peers, since the picking “cleans” only the first
half of the cache. To overcome this limitation, QuickPeer periodically triggers
a cleanCache procedure that probe peers that appear in the second half of the
cache. The frequency at which this procedure is activated may be adaptively
tuned to limit the network traffic generated by the probes.
4.2.2 Experimental evaluation
We validate QuickPeer effectiveness in building latency-aware overlay topologies
using simulation. Experiments have been performed on Peersim, a Java-based
cycle-driven simulator developed in the Bison project [bis]. We consider three
different network sizes: 212, 213 and 214 nodes. Network topologies are generated
with the Brite Internet topology generator [bri], using the Waxman algorithm on
a flat router model. The output of this phase is a weighted graph, where weights
represents latencies between routers in the generated topology. We then run all-
pairs shortest paths on the generated graph to obtain a matrix of RTT distance
between all pairs of routers in the network. Creating RTT matrix offline speeds
up simulations and allows us to simulate larger networks. A VIVALDI simula-
tion is then ran on this data to build the five-dimensional coordinates1 used in
QuickPeer experiments.
The QuickPeer cache size k is set to 40 in all the experiments discussed in this
section. An instance of the Newscast protocol boostraps the QuickPeer caches at
1According to the version of the VIVALDI protocol we have adopted, five dimensions are
sufficient to achieve a very good estimate of the RTT; see [DCKM04]
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beginning of the simulations2.
Our experiments focus on the evaluation of the following QuickPeer aspects:
1. protocol scalability and convergence rate: how well the protocol scales as
the network size increase. We measure the convergence rate as the percent-
age of nodes which hold its closest node reference (ID) in cache.
2. robustness: how QuickPeer reacts to fluctuations in the peer population.
All the results presented here have been averaged over 10 simulation runs.
Static scenario Wepresent experiments that evaluates QuickPeer scalability and
convergence rate in static overlays (i.e., no nodes joining or leaving the networks).
We presents results obtained using two distinct cache trimming policies: close-
Policy and closeFarPolicy. These results show that QuickPeer scales well and is
fast in constructing optimal, large-scale latency-aware topologies.
ClosePolicy Figure 4.3 presents the QuickPeer convergence performance us-
ing the ClosePolicy trimming policy with parameter k = 40. The first thing to
note is that QuickPeer convergence rate does not depend on the network size. For
all the three scenarios, more than 99.5% of the peers have their closest neighbor
in cache at cycle 20. However, QuickPeer reaches 100% optimality only around
cycle 60. In fact, as the protocol clusters close neighbors together, it becomes
harder and harder for those peers that did not reach optimality to find their clos-
est neighbor.
To improve the convergence speed in the final phase, we implement the fol-
lowing optimization. At each cache exchange, the randomized cache maintained
by the underlying PSS is added to the merging process. This optimization yields
100% convergence at about cycle 30, as can be seen in figure 4.3. Note that this
2Newscast cache size is also set to 40
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Figure 4.3: Convergence rate expressed in percentage of nodes for each network
size. The second line of pictures show the final phase details.
feature comes at no added cost in terms of network usage since the merge pro-
cess is local at each node. For these reasons, we have decided to keep this feature
always on during all the other tests.
CloseFarPolicy Figure 4.4 shows the convergence performance obtainedwith
the CloseFar trim policy. With this policy, QuickPeer provides each peer with the
closest and the furthest neighbors present in the overlay. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 4.4, close and far convergence rate are pretty similar. However, in all our
experiments, we experienced that QuickPeer locates more easily furthest nodes
in the initial convergence phase.
This policy merges both the effects we would obtain by two distinct instances
of the protocol having a Close and “Far” policy, without their overhead.
Dynamic scenarios We present experiments that evaluate QuickPeer scalability
and convergence rate in dynamic overlays. We consider amassive node crash sce-
nario in which half of the nodes are killed during QuickPeer convergence phase
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Figure 4.4: QuickPeer convergence performance for each network size. The Close-
Far policy is used to trim the node caches. Two kinds of optimality are considered:
close convergence (standard line) and far convergence (dotted line).
and show that the protocol handles the failures gracefully. In addition, we eval-
uate QuickPeer behavior in a scenario where a large number of nodes join the
overlay during the convergence phase. Even in this case, QuickPeer adapts to the
dynamic conditions of the environment.
Nodes crash To evaluate the protocol robustness in case of a massive node
crash, we ran the following experiment. The experiment starts with a network of
214 nodes. At cycle 5, right in the middle of the Quickpeer convergence process,
50% of the active nodes fail.
In this catastrophic scenario, QuickPeer is still performing well, as depicted
in Figure 4.5. Note that QuickPeer convergence is still increasing even one cycle
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Figure 4.5: Massive crash scenario: 50% of nodes are randomly crashed (re-
moved) at cycle 5. The two sub-figures depict respectively the convergence rate
and average node cache pollution per node.
after themassive node crash and optimality is reached in about the 30 cycles. This
behavior is expected, since now QuickPeer has an easier job to accomplish given
the smaller size of the overlay.
After the node crash, each node holds in its cache, with high probability, ref-
erences to failed nodes. In this experiment, the cleanCache procedure is triggered
every 3 simulation cycles.
The bottom sub-figure in Figure 4.5 shows that, after the crash, the node
caches are getting populated with failed IDs. Without the clean cache procedure,
the number of failed IDs initially tend to decrease due to the cleaning process as-
sociatedwith the picking in the first half of the cache. However, after a few cycles,
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Figure 4.6: Convergence rate for the massive nodes join: starting from 213 nodes
network, 4096 new nodes are added at cycle 5. The arrow (between cycle 5-6)
indicates a transient slow down in convergence rate due to the massive node
join.
the average pollution stabilizes around 45% of the cache size (i.e., it fills nearly
half of the cache). The cleancache procedure stops this pathological behavior at
cycle 10.
Nodes join QuickPeer reaction to a massive node join scenario is depicted
in Figure 4.6. The experiment starts with an overlay network of 8192 nodes. At
cycle 5, 4096 new nodes join the overlay.
The convergence rate slows down at cycle 5, just after the massive join. Af-
ter this step, the rate grows exponentially as in previous experiments until full
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convergence is achieved at cycle 30.
4.2.3 QuickPeer discussion
The QuickPeer topology may be useful for several distributed applications, like
distributed online gaming, context-aware P2P applications and QoS-aware pub-
lish/subscribe systems. The distinctive feature of QuickPeer is that it can manage
large scale overlay topologies providing each host in the overlay with its closest
or furthest neighbor, according to network distance (RTT), in few gossip rounds.
Experimental results proves Quickpeer scalability, robustness to failures and
adaptiveness to scenarios in which large numbers of nodes join the overlay con-
currently.
4.2.4 QuickPeer under hub attack
We have compared the performance of the QuickPeer (QP) topology manager
protocol running over a corrupted PSS layer. We adopted a network of 8,192
nodes whose latency model has been generated by the Brite Internet topology
generator according to the procedure described in Section 4.2.2.
Figure 4.7 shows the QuickPeer’s performance (e.g., in terms of the percent-
age of the nodes successfully arranged in a latency-aware fashion) according to
increasing levels of the PSS cache pollution.
With a pollution in the range [0 : 80[, QP is almost not affected. We can expect
this result as QP starts from a copy of the current PSS cache and evolves by gos-
siping its own cache. If the starting cache is sufficiently random, then the protocol
can wire its own latency-oriented topology.
In our example network, the QP latency-aware topology starts degrading
from an 80% PSS pollution level, however the performance gap is negligible in
this case. The performance drop is much more evident with the 85% and 90%
levels of pollution in which the starting network is severely clustered and nodes
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Figure 4.7: Impact of the hub attack over the QuickPeer protocol. Network size
is 8,192 nodes.
are trapped in their local neighborhood. Higher levels of pollution lead to an
obvious almost null result (e.g., no nodes hold the closest neighbor in cache).
The hub attack affects the QP protocol only when the PSS topology is close to
the hub topology; however, this is still a serious threat. Essentially, it means that
any QP instance started 25 or more cycles later than a hub attack (over the PSS
used by the QP instance), will have troubles or will not be able to generate the
desired topology at all.
In addition, the hub topology generated by the attack will prevent QP from
perceiving new node arrivals in a dynamic environment, as all newcomers will
join directly the malicious nodes.
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The hub attack model is general enough to be applied directly to other topol-
ogy manager algorithms such as QP. In other words, now we consider to apply
the hub attack and its malicious behavior to the nodes playing the QP protocol
instead of the PSS. In fact, both QP and the PSS are very close to the basic gossip
scheme and just a small protocol-specific adaptation is required. The following
example shows how flexible our attack model actually is.
While the ordinary attack for the PSS involves forging the timestamps of the
IDs in the message (see Section), here we also forge the coordinates of the mali-
cious nodes when they exchange the cache with a neighbor. The coordinate must
be close as possible to the coordinate of the neighbor in order to be accepted by
the neighbor in its next cache update as the closest node so far. Each attacker
coordinate (with n dimensions) can be forged in the following manner:
xa1 = xn1 ± rnd()
xa2 = xn2 ± rnd()
...
...
...
xan = xnn ± rnd()
where xai and xni are respectively the ith element of the attacker and neighbor
coordinate; rnd() is a function that returns a random number in the range ∈ [0 :
]. The value of  can be selected according to the actual coordinate distribution
of the network (latency-distribution).
This simple adaptation leads to the emergence of a hub topology instead of
the QP latency-aware overlay. The same approach can be applied to the T-Man
[JB05] protocol family.
The hub attack can be successfully applied to the QP protocol independently
of the presence of a healthy or poisoned PSS. In fact, although the PSS is healthy
and QP takes cache snapshots from it finding new potential neighbors, the neigh-
bors coordinate will hardly be closer to the current node than the attacker’s co-
ordinate (if  has been carefully selected). Thus, the attacker IDs will continue to
persist in the node’s cache.
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4.3 SuperPeer protocol
Modern P2P networks present several unique aspects that distinguish them from
traditional distributed systems. Networks comprising hundreds of thousand of
peers are not uncommon. A consequence of such scale is extreme dynamism,
with a continuous flow of nodes joining or leaving. Such characteristics present
several challenges to the developer. Neither a central authority nor a fixed com-
munication topology can be employed to control the various components. In-
stead, a dynamically changing overlay topology is maintained and control is
completely decentralized. The topology is defined by ”cooperation” links among
nodes, that are created and deleted based on the requirements of the particular
application.
Aswe stated in Chapter 1, the choice of a particular topology is a crucial aspect
of P2P design.
A distinct, but related problem regards roles that nodes may assume: original
P2P systems were based on a complete “democracy” among nodes: “everyone is
a peer”. But physical hosts running P2P software are usually very heterogeneous
in terms of computing, storage and communication resources, ranging from high-
end servers to low-end desktop machines.
The superpeer paradigm is an answer to both issues [Gnu, fas]. It is based
on a two-level hierarchy: superpeers are nodes faster and/or more reliable than
“normal” nodes and take on server-like responsibilities and provide services to
a set of clients. For example, in the case of file sharing, a superpeer builds an
index of the files shared by its clients and participates in the search protocol on
their behalf. Superpeers allow decentralized networks to run more efficiently by
exploiting heterogeneity and distributing load to machines that can handle the
burden. On the other hand, this architecture does not inherit the flaws of the
client-server model, as it allows multiple, separate points of failure, increasing
the health of the P2P network.
The superpeer paradigm is not limited to file sharing: it can be seen as a
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general approach for P2P networking. Yet, the structural details are strongly
application-dependent, so we cannot identify a “standard” superpeer topology.
In this paper, we focus our investigation on a specific aspect of the problem:
proximity. Our goal is to build a topology where clients and superpeers are re-
lated based on their distance (in terms of communication latency). The idea is
to select superpeers among the most powerful nodes, and to associate them with
clients whose round-trip time is bounded by a specified constant. This is a generic
problem, whose solution can be beneficial to several P2P applications. Examples
include online games such as Age of Empires [BT01], P2P telephony networks
such as Skype [Sky] and streaming applications such as PeerCast [peea]. In all
these cases, communication latency is one of the main concerns.
Our solution, called SG-2, is a self-organizing, decentralized protocol capable
of building and maintaining superpeer-based, proximity-aware overlay topolo-
gies. SG-2 uses an epidemic protocol to spread messages to nearby nodes, and
implements a task allocation protocol that mimics the behavior of social insects.
These biology-inspired mechanisms are combined to promote the “best” nodes
to the superpeer status, and to associate them to nearby clients.
To validate the results of our protocol, we considered a specific test case: on-
line games. In these applications, a large number of players interact together (or
against each other) in virtual worlds. Most online games follow a classic client-
server model, but we believe that the superpeer paradigm could represent an
interesting alternative. We envision a system where a small number of power-
ful nodes act as state servers when needed, with the remaining ones acting as
clients. All nodes run the same code and can switch from the first role to the sec-
ond when needed. Thus, superpeers dynamically change over time, depending
on the environment conditions.
4.3.1 SystemModel
The systemmodel for our superpeer scenario is quite similar to the one described
in Section 4.2.1; however, the following extensions are required.
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Nodes are heterogenous: they differ in their computational and storage capa-
bilities, and also (and more importantly) with respect to the bandwidth of their
network connection. To discriminate between nodes that may act as superpeers
and nodes that must be relegated to the role of clients, each node v is associated
with a capacity value cap(v), that represents the number of clients that can be han-
dled by v. To simplify our simulations, we assume that each node knows its ca-
pacity. In reality, this parameter is strongly dependent on the specific application,
and can be easily computed on-the-fly through on-line measurements.
Besides capacity associated to each single node (“how many”), another pa-
rameter to be considered is the end-to-end latency between nodes (“how well”).
In ourmodel, each pair of nodes (v,w) is associatedwith a latency distance lat(v,w),
representing the average round-trip time (RTT) experienced by communications
between them. The latency distance between a specific pair of nodes may bemea-
sured directly and precisely through ping messages, or approximately estimated
through a virtual coordinate service [DCKM04]; given the dynamic nature of our
system and the large number of nodes to be evaluated as potential neighbors, we
will adopt the latter approach.
4.3.2 The Problem
Generally speaking, our goal is to create a topology where the most powerful
nodes (in terms of capacity) are promoted to the role of superpeers, and the asso-
ciation clients/superpeers is such that each client obtains a configurable quality of
service (in terms of latency distance) from its superpeer.
More formally, we define the problem of building a proximity-aware, superpeer-
based topology as follows. At any given time, the problem input is given by the
current set of nodes V , and the functions cap() and lat() defined over it. Further-
more, a global parameter tol expresses the maximum latency distance that can be
tolerated between clients and superpeers. The constraints describing our target
topology are the following:
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• each node is either a superpeer or a client;
• each client c is associated to exactly one superpeer s (we write super(c) = s);
• the number of clients associated to a superpeer s does not exceed cap(s);
• given a superpeer s and one of its clients c, we require that lat(s, c) ≤ tol.
To avoid ending upwith a set of disconnected, star-shaped components rooted
at each superpeer, we require that superpeers form another proximity-based over-
lay: two superpeers are connected if their latency distance is smaller than tol+δ,
where δ is another configuration parameter.
We aim at selecting as few superpeers as possible (otherwise, the problem
could be trivially solved by each node acting as a superpeer, with no client/superpeer
connections). This choice is motivated, once again, by the particular scenario we
are considering: in online games, superpeers manage the distributed simulation
state, so centralizing as many decisions as possible is important from the perfor-
mance point of view. Note that given the dynamism of our environment, obtain-
ing the minimum number of superpeers may be difficult, or even impossible. But
even in a steady state, the resulting optimization problem is NP-complete.
4.3.3 The SG-2 Protocol
The architecture of SG-2 is shown in Figure 4.8; here, we briefly describe the ra-
tionale behind it, leaving implementation details to the following subsections.
Our solution to the problem described above is based on a fundamental ob-
servation: measuring precisely the RTT between all pairs of nodes (e.g., through
pings) is extremely slow and costly, or even impossible due to topology dy-
namism. To circumvent this problem, and allow nodes to estimate their latency
without direct communication, the concept of virtual coordinate service has been
developed [DCKM04]. The aim of this service is to associate every node with
a synthetic coordinate in a virtual, n-dimensional space. The Euclidean distance
between the coordinates of two nodes can be used to predict, with good accuracy,
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Figure 4.8: The set of services com-
posing the SG-2 architecture.
Figure 4.9: A superpeer topology in
a bi-dimensional virtual space, where
Euclidean distance corresponds to la-
tency.
the RTT between them; in other words, it is sufficient for two nodes to learn about
their coordinates to estimate their latency, without direct measurements.
Our problem may be redefined based on the concept of virtual coordinates.
Nodes are represented by points in the virtual space; each of them is associated
with an influence zone, described as a n-dimensional sphere of radius tol centered
at the node. Our goal is to cover the virtual space with a small number of super-
peers, in such a way that all nodes are either superpeers or are included in the
influence zone of a superpeer. Figure 4.9 shows the topology resulting from the
execution of SG-2 in a bi-dimensional virtual space.
Nodes communicate with each other using a local broadcast service, whose task
is to efficiently disseminate messages to nodes included in the influence zone of
the sender. This service is used by powerful nodes to advertise their availability
to serve as superpeers, and by ordinary nodes to seek superpeers whose capacity
has not been saturated yet.
The main component of SG-2 is the superpeer management service, which selects
the superpeers and associates clients to them. The protocol is heavily inspired by
the behavior of social insects [BDT99], such as ants or bees, that have developed
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very sophisticatedmechanisms for labor division. In summary, suchmechanisms
work as follows. In a totally decentralized fashion, specialized groups of individ-
uals emerge, with each group aimed at performing some particular task. The
task allocation process is dynamic and follows the community needs according
to changes in the environment. The stimulus to perform some kind of task or to
switch to another one can be given by many factors, but it is normally given by
high concentrations of chemical signals, such as pheromones, that are released
by other individuals and are spread in the environment. Each individual has its
own response threshold to the stimulus and reacts accordingly.
The superpeer protocol mimics this general picture. Un-associated nodes dif-
fuse a “request for superpeers” signal through local broadcasts; the signal concen-
tration in the network may stochastically trigger a switch to the superpeer role in
some nodes according to their response threshold, which is proportional to their
capacity. On the other hand, powerful nodes covering the same area of the virtual
space compete with each other to gain new clients, by signaling their availability
through local broadcasts. Clients associate themselves to the most powerful su-
perpeers, and superpeers with an empty client set switch back to the client role.
The combination of these two trends (the creation of new superpeers to satisfy
client requests and the removal of unnecessary superpeers) finds its equilibrium
in a topology that approximates out target topology.
The last component to be addressed is the peer sampling service. As we already
know the features of this service from the previous chapters, we just remind that
the task of this protocol-layer is to provide each node with a view containing a
random sample of nodes [JGKvS04].
Virtual Coordinate Service
In SG-2, the virtual coordinate service is provided by VIVALDI [DCKM04], which
has been already described in Section 4.2.1.
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Local Broadcast Service
Unlike previous layers, based on existing protocols, the local broadcast service
has adapted an existing protocol for the specific needs of SG-2 [EGH+03]. Each
messagem is associated with the sender identifier sm and a radius parameter rm.
Messagem is delivered to all those nodes that are within latency distance rm from
sm, as estimated by VIVALDI. Hence, the name SPHERECAST.
The protocol may be described as follows. When a node either receives a
message or wants to multicast a new one, it forwards it to its local fan-out. The
fan-out of node v for message m is given by the subset of neighbors known to v
that are potentially interested in the message, i.e. whose distance from sm is not
larger than rm. SPHERECAST does not maintain its own topology; instead, it relies
on the underlying overlay network provided by the peer sampling service.
When a message is originated locally, or it is received for the first time, it is
forwarded immediately to all nodes in the fan-out. If a message has been already
received, a node may stochastically decide to drop it (i.e., not forwarding it). This
is a standard approach used to avoid flooding the network. A strict determinis-
tic approach such as dropping any multiple copy would not work correctly due
to the nature of the underlying overlay. The actual clustering coefficient of the
underlying topology and the continuous rewiring process may stop the message
spreading. The stochastic approach solves this issue in a straightforwardmanner.
The probability of dropping a message is given by the following formula: p =
1− e−s/ϑ, where s is the number of times the node has seen this message and ϑ is
a response threshold parameter. In this way, when a packet is received multiple
times by a peer, it has less and less probability to be forwarded again. From an
implementation point of view, digests of received messages are stored in a per-
node table, together with the number of times that specific message has been
received. This table is managed with a LRU policy, to avoid unbounded growth.
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Superpeer Management Service
This layer is the core component of SG-2. Nodes participate in this protocol either
as superpeers or as clients; a client c may be either associated to a superpeer
(super(c) = s), or actively seeking a superpeer in its tol range (super(c) = ⊥). At
the beginning, all nodes start as clients; to converge to the target topology defined
in Section 4.3.2, nodes may switch role at will, or change their client-superpeer
relationship. The decision process is completely decentralized.
Each node vmaintains the following local variables. role specifies the role cur-
rently adopted by v; role = SP if v is a superpeer, role = CL otherwise. clv and spv
are two views, respectively containing the clients and the superpeers known to v.
They are composed of node descriptors combining an identifier w and a logical
time-stamp tsw; the latter is used to purge obsolete identifiers, as in NEWSCAST.
When v acts as a superpeer, clv is populated with the clients currently associ-
ated to v; it is empty otherwise. The size of clv is limited by cap(v). spv contains
descriptors for the superpeers that are in tol+δ range; its size is not explicitly
limited, but rather is bounded by the limited number of superpeers that can be
found within tol+δ distance. When v acts as a client, one of the descriptors in spv
may be the associated superpeer of v.
Two distinct kinds of messages are broadcasted using SPHERECAST: CL-BCAST
and SP-BCAST. The former are sent while in client state and are characterized
by a radius parameter rm equal to tol, i.e. the maximum tolerated latency. The
latter are used in superpeer state and their radius parameter is equal to tol+δ;
superpeers need a wider radius to get a chance to contact other superpeers; fur-
thermore, nodes with overlapping influence zones can exchange clients if they
find a better client allocation that reduces their latency.
At each node, two threads are executed, one active and one passive. The ex-
ecution of active threads may be subdivided in periodic cycles: in each cycle,
superpeers emit a SP-BCAST signal which is broadcast in the surrounding area, to
notify nodes about their presence and its residual capacity. Clients, on the other
hand, periodically emit CL-BCAST messages if and only if they are not associated
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to any superpeer. The shorter the cycle duration, the faster the system converge
to the target topology; but clearly, the overhead grows proportionally. The pas-
sive threads react to incoming messages according to the message type and the
current role. Four distinct cases are possible:
Superpeer v gets 〈SP-BCAST, s, tss, cap(s)〉 : the pair (s, tss) is inserted in spv. If s
was already present, its time-stamp is updated. After that, the capacity of the two
supernodes is compared: if cap(v) > cap(s), then a migration process is started.
Clients associated with s that are inside the influence zone of vmigrate to v, until
the capacity is exhausted. Each affected client is notified about the new superpeer
(v) by the current superpeer s. Node s, if left with no clients, switches back to the
client role; it associates itself to v, if est(v, s) ≤ tol and v has still residual capacity;
otherwise, it starts emitting CL-BCAST messages.
Superpeer v gets 〈CL-BCAST, c, tsc〉 : if | clv(v)| < cap(v) (the capacity of v has not
been exhausted), the client node is associated to v (unless, given the asynchrony
of messages, it has been already associated with another superpeer).
Client v gets 〈SP-BCAST, s, tss, cap(s)〉 : the pair (s, tss) is inserted in spv. If swas
already present, its time-stamp is updated. If v is not client of any superpeer, it
sends a request to s asking to be associatedwith it. The responsemay be negative,
if s has exhausted its capacity in the period between the sending of the message
and its receipt by v. On the other hand, if v is already client of another superpeer
s ′ and cap(s) > cap(s ′), then it tries to migrate to the more powerful superpeer.
This strategy promotes the emergence of a small set of high-capacity superpeers.
Client c gets 〈CL-BCAST, c, tsc〉 : This kind of messages can trigger a role change
from client to superpeer; it is the cornerstone of our approach. The willingness of
becoming a superpeer is a function of a node threshold parameter and the signal
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concentration perceived by a node in its influence area. The switching probability
can be modeled by the following function:
P(role(v) = CL → role(v) = SP) = s2
s2 + θ2v
where s is the signal magnitude and θv is the response threshold of node v. This
function is such that the probability of performing a switch is close to 1, if s θ,
and it is close to 0 if s θ. If cmax is the maximum capacity, θv is initialized with
a value which is cmax − cap(v); in this way, nodes with higher capacity have a
larger probability of becoming superpeers. The maximum capacity may be either
known, or it can be easily computed by an aggregation protocol in a robust and
decentralized fashion [JMB05].
After the initialization, in order to make the topology more stable and avoid
fluctuations, the response threshold is modified in such a way that time reinforces
the peer role: the more time spent as a client, the less probable it is to change role.
Once again, the inspiration for this approach comes from biology: it has been ob-
served, for example, that the time spent by an individual insect on a particular
task produces important changes in some brain areas. Due to these changes, the
probability of a task change (e.g., from foraging to nursing) is a decreasing func-
tion of the time spent on the current task [BDT99]. For this reason, θv is reinforced
as follows:
θv(t) = θv(t− 1) + (α · (t− t ′v))
Where t is the current cycle and t ′v is the last cycle in which v became a superpeer;
α is a parameter to limit or increase the time influence. The peer normal respon-
siveness is re-initialized based on its local capacity if its superpeer crashes or if it
becomes a superpeer node.
The reaction to CL-BCAST messages is the only mechanism to allow a client to
become a superpeer. A superpeer can switch back to the client role only when
other higher capacity superpeers have drained its client set. The θ adaptation
process is only active when a node is in the client state.
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4.3.4 Experimental results
We performed a large number of experiments based on simulation to validate the
effectiveness of our approach. The goal of our experiments was twofold: first
of all, we measured the speed of convergence in a stable overlay, in the absence
of failures; second, we measured the robustness of our approach in a dynamic
environment, where a fixed percentage of nodes are substituted with fresh ones
periodically. Any node in the network can be affected by substitution, regard-
less of its role. Unlike the real world, where a superpeer is supposed to be more
reliable, our choice is stricter and more “catastrophic”. Finally, communication
overhead has been measured. The experiments have been performed using Peer-
sim [peeb].
In our experiments, network size is fixed at 1000 and 2000 nodes. Several
kinds of networks have been considered, but here, due to space restrictions, the
focus is on gaming-oriented scenario [ZS04, SGB+03]. Other scenarios present sim-
ilar results. For each pair of nodes v,w, the latency distance lat(v,w) among them
has been generated using a normal distribution with average value µ = 250ms
and variance σ = 0.1 [ZS04]. Then, we have run VIVALDI on this network, ob-
taining the corresponding function est(v,w). In the corresponding virtual space,
we have considered tol values of 200ms, 250ms and 300ms, which are typical of
strategy and role-playing games. We have experimented with δ values of 200ms,
300ms and 400ms, corresponding to typical round-trip time that can be accepted
for superpeer communication. The capacity function cap(), i.e. the maximum
number of clients that can be served, is generated through an uniform distribu-
tion in the range [1 : 500]. The simulation is organized in synchronous cycles,
during which each node has the possibility to initiate a gossip exchange; note,
however, that in reality node do not need to be synchronized. All the results are
averaged over 10 experiments.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the behavior of the protocol over time. All the figures
in the left column are obtained in networks whose size is 1000 nodes, while the
figures in the right column are relative to networks with size equal to 2000 nodes.
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The content of each sub-figure is divided in two parts; in the main plot, the num-
ber of superpeer active at each cycle is shown; in the small frame inside the main
plot, the percentage of clients that are already associated is shown. In these ex-
periments, the network is static; no nodes are removed or added.
Figure 4.10(a) depicts a rather bad situation: in both network sizes, the con-
vergence is extremely slow, and the number of nodes that are satisfied is low.
This bad performance is motivated by the characteristics of the latency distri-
butions [ZS04, SGB+03] and the tolerance value selected; most of the node pairs
have a higher latency than 200ms, and thus SG-2 cannot helpmuch. Figure 4.10(b)
shows a much better situation: a large percentage of clients (between 94% and
100% depending on size and parameter δ) have been associated after only few
cycles (10-20). The number of superpeers is also very small, after an initial peak
due to a large number of clients reacting to the signal. Almost every client can
reach the required latency because 250ms is the average pairwise latency in our
game-like coordinates distribution. However, some nodes lies outside the 250ms
border and it is challenging for SG-2 to accommodate those nodes. The node
density plays an important role for SG-2. In fact, the bigger network can be fully
organized in a latency-aware fashion using the wider superpeer communication
range (δ = 400ms). Figure 4.10(c) shows the performance for tol = 300ms: a re-
sponse time that is perfectly acceptable in a strategic/role playing game scenario.
The latency-aware topology in the figure is very good with any δ value. We ob-
tain 100% of in range clients with about 50 superpeers in the small network and
about 63 in the bigger network, in less than 10 cycles.
Figure 4.11 is aimed at illustrating the robustness of our protocol. The size of
the network is fixed at 1000 nodes. Its composition, however, is dynamic: at each
cycle, 10% or 20% of the nodes crashes and are substituted with new ones. The
figure shows that the number of superpeers oscillates over time, as expected, and
that up to 80% and 70% of the clients are associated to superpeers. The nodes that
are not associated are those that have been recently created and are trying to find
a position in the topology.
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Finally, we discuss message overhead; due to space limitations, we provide
summary data instead of plots. We have measured the number of broadcast mes-
sages, including both CL-BCAST and SP-BCAST. Since the former type of message
is broadcast only in case of lack of satisfaction, only a small number of them are
generated: on average, less than 2 messages every thousand nodes. Superpeers,
on the other hand, continuously send one message per cycle.
4.3.5 SG-2 discussion
The superpeer approach to organize a P2P overlay is a trade-off solution that
merges the client-server model relative simplicity and the P2P autonomy and
resilience to crashes. The need for a superpeer network is mainly motivated by
the fact to overcome the heterogeneity of peers deployed on the Internet.
Yang and Garcia Molina [YGM03] proposed some design guidelines. A mech-
anism to split node clusters is proposed and evaluated analytically, but no exper-
imental results are presented.
Superpeer solutions proved to be effective solutions in the real world: Kazaa
/ Fasttrack [fas] and Skype [Sky] are two outstanding examples. However, their
actual protocols are not publicly available and they cannot be compared with any
other solution or idea. At the time of writing, only a few works [LRW03, Sky]
describe some low-level networking details.
The SG-2 protocol can be considered as a natural evolution of the SG-1[Mon04]
protocol; the two solutions, however, cannot be directly compared from a perfor-
mance point of view because of their different goals. SG-1 focuses on optimizing
the available bandwidth in the system, while SG-2 introduces the notion of la-
tency between peer pairs and poses a QoS limit on it. The definition of the target
topology is straightforward in SG-1 (e.g., the minimum number of superpeers to
accommodate all the peers according to the superpeer capacities), while it is a
NP-problem in the SG-2 case. From the architectural point of view, they both rely
on the existence of an underlying random overlay. The superpeer overlay is gen-
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erated on top of it. The superpeer election process in SG-2 is strongly bio-inspired
and much more randomized than approach used in SG-1.
In [SH06], the authors propose a socio-economic inspiration based on Shelling’s
model to create a variation of the super-peer topology. Such variation allows the
ordinary peers to be connects with each other and to be connected to more than
one super peer at the same time. This topology focuses on efficient search. As in
our case, the superpeers are connected to each other to form a network of hubs
and both solutions are suited for unstructured networks. However, they do not
address the problem of the superpeer election.
The basic problem of finding the best peer, having the required characteris-
tics, to accomplish some task (e.i., the superpeer task) is addressed in a more
general form in [AKR+05]. The problem is referred as “optimal peer selection”
in P2P downloading and streaming scenarios. The authors use an economics in-
spired method to solve the optimization problem; the developed methodologies
are general and applicable to a variety of P2P resource economy problems. The
proposed solution is analytically strong, but no experimental results are shown
especially regarding a large and dynamic scenario as the one the authors are ad-
dressing.
Our implementation is based on VIVALDI (see section 4.3.3), but it is not tied
to any particular virtual coordinate service. Other architectures can be adopted,
such as IDMaps [FJJ+99] and GNP [NZ02] or PIC [CMAP04] and PCoord [LL04].
The first two rely on deployment of infrastructures nodes, while the other provide
latency estimates gathered only between end-hosts, as VIVALDI does. We opted
for VIVALDI because of its fully distributed nature and simple implementation.
In less strict latency context, the hop-count is usually preferred in contrast to
the millisecond latency to provide distance estimation. Pastry [RD01, CDHR02],
for example, uses a hop distance metric to optimize its response time.
Finally, SG-2 is a fully decentralized, self-organizing protocol for the construc-
tion of proximity-aware, superpeer-based overlay topologies. The protocol pro-
duces an overlay in which almost all nodes (99.5%) are in range with a tol la-
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tency of 300ms. The number of generated superpeers is small with respect to
the network size (only 3-5%). The protocol shows also an acceptable robustness
to churn. We believe that these results can be profitably adopted to implement
several classes of applications, including strategy and role-playing games. Other
classes of games, such as first-person shooter, are probably not suitable given
their extremely strict latency requirements (inferior to 100ms). These results are
an improvement over existing decentralized games [BT01], that are based on
strong replication [unr] or low-level facilities such as IP-multicast [GD98]).
We conclude noting that the results presented in this paper are only a first step
toward the implementation of real superpeer applications; for example, in the
case of P2P games, several other problems have to be solved, including security,
state replication, state distribution, etc.
4.3.6 Superpeer topology under hub-attack
As we stated previously in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the hub attack can affect not only
the PSS itself, but also any higher level service relying on the PSS. This fact makes
the attack a more serious threat for P2P systems.
We present an example showing the effect of the hub attack over a particular
superpeer topology emerged by SG-2. The service 3 is highly dependent on the
PSS and all its details are discussed in [JMB06].
From an algorithmic point of view, the key point is that the pheromone diffu-
sion is made through a simple message-spreading protocol that uses the neigh-
borhoodmanaged by the PSS cache (see Section 4.3.3); a message has a maximum
distance range to spread, therefore it is spread only to those neighbors that are at
a tol distance range from the message source. Essentially, the SG-2 local broadcast
service limits by itself the effective out degree of a node’s PSS cache.
This fact implies that a full (100%) PSS cache pollution is not required to stop
the spreading of a message, as a certain amount of the neighbors is excluded by
3The word “SG-2” can be used to refer to the SG-2 core protocol described in Section 4.3.3 or
to the SG-2 service architecture depicted is Figure 4.8.
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default due to the distance constraint. The broadcast service involuntary helps
the attacker’s job. Figure 4.12 shows two snapshots of the SP topology; the picture
on the left shows the normal SG-2 behavior in standards conditions, while the
picture on the right shows the effect of the hub attack over SG-2. Both snapshots
have been taken when the topology is supposed to be completed (e.g., at cycle
30).
The network size is limited to 1,000 nodes and the distribution of the laten-
cies follows a typical distributed game scenario (see Section 4.3.4 for details),
tol = 300ms allowed is 300ms. The big black dots depicts the emerged SP nodes;
the thick lines show the SP connections, while the thin dotted lines show the con-
nection relation between an ordinary nodes and its SP.
Figure 4.12(a) shows the normal SG-2 behavior in this context. The areas with
a higher concentration of nodes are populated with more than one superpeer
node; in this context, all ordinary peers are connected to an SP satisfying the
desired QoS. Compared to the network size, the number of superpeer nodes is
quite low ( 5%). Figure 4.12(b) depicts a dramatic situation. Without an effective
pheromone communication, the system tends to be paralyzed. Each message
takes a few cycles to cover the required area, but at the same time the attack
pollutes the PSS caches. The result is that a message is either lost (e.g., finds
no more neighbors to spread to) or it reaches an attacker node. This triggers
the most capable attacker nodes to the SP status: the 14 superpeers available in
Figure 4.12(b) are malicious nodes and they have acquired just a few clients in
the early stages of the protocol. Many other nodes nodes cannot find any (good
or malicious) SP because the SP messages can not be routed; in addition any
capable ordinary node cannot switch to the SP status because it cannot perceive
any message, as all traffic is sent to the attackers by default.
The effect of the hub attack may vary according to the actual SG-2 parameters;
for example, with a different scenario, we had an enormous amount of SP ( 30% of
the network population), but at the same time a low percentage of clients having
the desired QoS (e.g., being connected to a tol range SP). In any case, the pres-
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ence of the hub attack prevents the formation and the management of a healthy
superpeer topology.
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Figure 4.10: Convergence time. Three tol values are considered: 200ms (a), 250ms
(b), 300ms (c). The main figures show the number of active superpeer at each
cycle, while the small sub-figures show the number of clients that are in tol range.
Three different δ values are shown in each figure.
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Figure 4.11: Experiments with churn. Network size is 1000; at each cycle, 10% or
20% of the nodes are substituted with new ones.
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(a) Normal conditions SG-2 service
(b) SG-2 under hub-attack, 20 mal. nodes
Figure 4.12: A 1,000 nodes superpeer topology generated by the SG-2 service in
normal conditions (a) and during a hub-attack (b); tol = 300ms, the PSS cache
size c=20 (in (b) 20 attackers are involved). The big dots represent the SP nodes,
the thick lines show the SP connections, while the thin lines show the connection
relation between an ordinary nodes and its SP.
Chapter 5
Proposed approach: the Secure Peer
Sampling Service
In this chapter we present our solution, the Secure Peer Sampling Service (SPSS),
aimed to preserve the integrity of the PSS topology from a hub attack. Like
the hub attack, our solution is independent of the actual PSS implementation
adopted.
We present the SPSS as an incremental two-step solution: the first step in-
volves the presence of one (or more) trusted node(s), while the second step fo-
cuses on a fully decentralised approach. For each solution step we present its
own performance evaluation.
5.1 The problem
Generally speaking, our goal is to avoid the formation of hubs. The SPSS result-
ing topologymust be as close as possible to the standard PSS topology (according
to the actual implementation adopted). This goal must be achieved using only a
node’s local information [SP03], as sharing any extra information would repre-
sent another chance for the attackers to subvert the network (e.g., by diffusing
fake suspicions).
As the only information available about the network is the local cache from a
node’s point of view, a good indication of the hub topology formation is the local
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node clustering coefficient (CC).
However, the CC is computed as the proportion between the vertexes within
the current node neighborhood (cache) divided by the number of links that could
possibly exists between them. From the definition above, it is easy to argue that
the node’s local state represented by the cache is not sufficient to calculate the CC;
in other words, the local cache and all the neighborhood caches are required. The
“many-to-many” cache exchange would generate an excessive communication
overhead and therefore we do not consider it as a viable approach.
As our goal is to limit the chance to generate hubs, we can let each node to
evaluate if it is going towards a hub at each gossip exchange; the evaluation is
based according to the local knowledge - i.e. the local cache - and to the neigh-
bor state (cache) that each node receives at each gossip exchange. Notice that the
essence of the PSS interaction scheme is not changed and the amount of informa-
tion exchanged is the same.
Essentially, the idea is to let each node to rate the quality of the exchange in
progress by comparing the caches of the involved parties. The quality rate is given
by the number of items (IDs) lying in the intersection of the exchanged caches
among node A and B: r = |{cacheA ∩ cacheB}|.
This process of rating the quality of the exchange does not imply to accom-
plish the gossip round just because both parties have already exchanged their
states, but instead it allows to accept or deny the exchange according to the per-
ceived quality rate. The quality rate influences the probability to conclude the gos-
sip exchange. Essentially, when two caches are similar (or identical) it is likely
that the current neighbor is a malicious node and with high probability it should
not be accepted.
Our aim is to verify the above property (i.e., the quality rate) in the least in-
vasive manner. In other words, we aim to gently integrate this approach in the
gossip scheme. We believe that designing our solution as a general scheme is a
primary concern in order to protect any PSS implementation from the hub attack.
Due to this reason, we are interested in the design of a new simple primitive
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do forever
wait(∆t)
neighbor = SELECTPEER()
SENDCACHE(neighbour)
neigborcache = RECEIVECACHE()
checkIDs(myCache, neighborcache)
myCache.UPDATE(neighborcache)
do forever
n state = RECEIVECACHE()
SENDCACHE(n state.sender)
checkIDs(myCache, neighborcache)
myCache.UPDATE(neighborcache)
(a) Active Thread (b) Passive Thread
Figure 5.1: The SPSS gossip scheme; essentially it is the PSS scheme extended
by the checkIDs() primitive. The strict relation with the gossip scheme (see Fig-
ure 2.1) is evident; as the node’s state in the PSS is the cache, the fundamental
methods have a slightly different name, but they still hold the same semantic.
that incapsulates the details of the quality verification process. This primitive can
be added in the standard gossip scheme depicted in Figure 2.1. We call this prim-
itive function CHECKIDS(). Figure 5.1 shows how the CHECKIDS() function fits
in the PSS scheme. The discussion of the actual action triggered by the function
is an algorithmic detail and we are going to discuss it in the next sections.
5.2 SPSS requirements
The general system model described in Section 2.2 still holds; in addition, in our
proposed SPSS solution, we require that in the bootstrap phase of the network,
each node joining the overlay obtains a certificate for its public key from a central
Certification Authority (CA). The CA is a centralised entity, but it is not involved in
the protocol itself; it is just needed to join the overlay. After that, a joining node
may obtain a starting neighbor list from a pre-assigned trusted node.
When a node leaves the network, voluntarily or due to a crash, its peer refer-
ence is quickly discarded by the underlying service, due to the properties of the
PSS implementation. If a peer uses a special exit message to leave the network,
then that peer must sign the message to prevent a DOS attack.
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We cryptographically secure each ID structure using the following message
format:
[IDA, tscreation, tsexpiration, PKA, σ]
where IDA is A’s node identifier (see Section 2.2), the ts are timestamps, PKA
is A’s public key and σ is the digital signature on the message. As noted earlier
in Section 3.2, we assume the set of attackers to be relatively small and that they
collude to forge each other’s signed ID structures to create validMN variant mes-
sages. For the FN variant, the attacker can forge signed ID structures for fake IDs
on its own.
5.3 SPSS approach
Our approach to solve the hub attack is twofold: (1) we aim to detect malicious
peers in the overlay with high accuracy and (2) we aim to reduce (nearly to zero)
the effects of malicious peer actions on the topology structure. Our solution is
designed to achieve these two goals with the least amount of effort.
The SPSS approach requires the presence of a trusted peer, the TRUSTED PROMPT
node. This node has functionality similar to a proxy of the CA and provides peer
credential management and access control. The important service provided for
SPSS by the TRUSTED PROMPT node is credential revocation of peers that manifest
malicious behavior.
To improve the resilience of our distributed system, we can also use multi-
ple TRUSTED PROMPT nodes without introducing any modification to our basic algo-
rithm. However, the trade-off between the robustness and the extra effort spent
in deploying, configuring and maintaining many TRUSTED PROMPT nodes must
be evaluated by the overlay designers. We stress that the TRUSTED PROMPT is not
a potential bottleneck, as will become clear below.
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The basic idea behind SPSS is the following: each peer executes the standard
PSS algorithm, but, after each message exchange round, it performs an addi-
tional checking step on the received cache list. When the check fails, ordinary
peers are potentially exchanging with a malicious peer; therefore, they contact the
TRUSTED PROMPT reporting the ID-structure provided by the suspect peer. The
TRUSTED PROMPT performs cryptographic checks to validate the raised suspicion
and if correct then supplies the notifying peer with a new complete cache entry.
This checking step has two distinct issues to deal with (1) malicious node IDs
and (2) fake IDs.
• Malicious nodes check: the peer compares its current cache C with the
newly received one, C∗ . This test has a stochastic nature and it is based
on the fact that, in the MN variant, it is likely to receive from the malicious
nodes a message holding a similar set (or subset) of malicious IDs. The
probability to raise a suspicion is proportional to r/c, where r is the quality
rate and c is the usual cache size.
When the stochastic process raise a suspicion, then the peer terminates the
exchange and contacts the TRUSTED PROMPT. This is a local check that does
not require extra messages or communication.
• Fake ID check: the peer checks a certain percentage α (global parameter) of
the IDs in the received cache by network communication (e.g., by sending
pingmessages). If a subset of fake IDs larger then α is found, the peer aborts
the exchange.
In order to support its suspicion of peer P, the peer provides the TRUSTED PROMPT
with both its own and the received caches as evidence. The TRUSTED PROMPT first
verifies if P’s ID signature is correct and that the ID matches the actual IP address
it is transmitting from. If verification fails, then P is confirmed as a malicious or
faulty peer and it is black-listed. Otherwise, it logs (or updates) an entry #(P) in
a frequency table indicating how many times P has been reported as suspect.
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Finally, the TRUSTED PROMPT builds a new cache for the querying peer. To
build the new cache, the TRUSTED PROMPT picks nodes randomly from the net-
work. A nodeQ is selected proportionally to 1− #(Q)NetSize for inclusion in a cache. A
lower value in the frequency table corresponds to a higher chance to be present
in the cache (and to be a non-malicious node). The size of the network required
by the formula can be computed in a distributed fashion using, for example, an
aggregation protocol [JMB05]. The process continues until c suitable peers are
found and then the cache is sent back to the peer. Clearly, the TRUSTED PROMPT is
not fail proof as the attacker identification is based on reported suspicions, which
cannot be 100% accurate. However, as shown in Section 5.4, the SPSS achieves
very good results in preventing the hub attack.
5.4 SPSS evaluation
To evaluate the SPSS, we adopted the same approach and the same set-up as
discussed in Section 3.3; in addition, we set α=5%. This percentage corresponds
to the amount of IDs actually checked at each cycle by each (non malicious) peer.
We restrict our discussion to the larger 10, 000 nodes overlay.
The SPSS performance is summarised in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2(a) shows the
average level of pollution lying in a peer’s cache during a 20 malicious nodes
(MN variant) attack. In this set-up, there is almost no difference between the
distinct percentages of checking. This behavior could be explained due to the
full ID pollution in this particular set-up: it is easy to detect a common subset of
replayed IDs, regardless the actual amount of checks. The difference between the
distinct checking efforts is still very low, this proves that our defence can prevent
the attack even with a low checking effort.
In less than 10 cycles the pollution level stabilises in a very low oscillation
range. The oscillations are due to the stochastic nature of the TRUSTED PROMPT
that may inject malicious nodes when it provides the new cache to a querying
peer. However, this has no long term negative consequences. The initial pollution
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Figure 5.2: Comparison among the PSS and the SPSS pollution ratio under a
Hub-Attack. The overlay size is 10, 000 nodes. Distinct checking setups are
shown.
peak is absorbed as soon as the TRUSTED PROMPT has received sufficient feedback
by the well behaving nodes.
Figure 5.2(b) shows how the SPSS deals with a FN variant attack. Two distinct
set-ups are considered: using 10 and 4 malicious nodes, while the rest of the IDs
in the cache are fake IDs. The check level adopted is α=5%, in order to detect fake
IDs. The two distinct checks almost doubles the chance to immediately identify a
malicious attack. Again, in less than 10 cycles, the pollution level drops to a near-
zero level. With such a low amount of pollution in the cache, the SPSS preserves
the original PSS topology properties and there is no danger of partitioning of the
overlay due to the malicious peers leaving.
Due to the dynamic nature of any P2P system, we decided to consider churn
and how the SPSS deals in this more realistic setting. Our churning results are
shown in Figure 5.3. Periodically, a fraction of the peer population leaves and is
substituted with new peers. The attacker nodes however, are not affected by the
churning process and they are allowed to pollute for the whole duration of the
experiment. We consider three churn set sizes: 1%, 5% and 10% of the network
size. These three values are quite high churning rates (see [MCR03]), but they are
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Figure 5.3: Dynamic scenario results: distinct level of churning rate (1%,5%
and 10% of the network population) are shown during a MN variant attack (20
m. nodes). (a) Depicts the average cache pollution, while (b) shows the differ-
ence among the average number of queries sustained by 1 or more (2, 4 and 8)
TRUSTED PROMPT using two distinct PSS implementations.
fine in order to stress our solution. The attackers involved are 20, playing theMN
variant of the hub attack.
Figure 5.3(a) shows the average cache pollution during the attack. With a
churn rate of 1%, the cache pollution has a peak of 7.5% at about cycle 20 and
then it tends to decrease. Strong oscillations are clearly visible in the picture due
to the dynamism itself; however, the pollution level is always in a very low range.
It is interesting to note that for higher churn rates, the pollution level is even
lower. This fact may seem counter intuitive, but the churning process triggers
the FN defense policy and aborts any exchange with any neighbor reporting an
unusual number of non existent node IDs in the cache. This side effect helps
keeping the cache cleaner.
We tried to let the attackers leave the network as in Section 3.1, but we never
had any partitioning report with such a low pollution levels.
Figure 5.3(b) shows the average number of queries per cycle. Multiple TRUSTED
PROMPTS and two distinct PSS implementations (e.g., NEWSCAST versus basic-
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shuffling, see Section 2.2.1) are considered. We restricted the TRUSTED PROMPT
number to a maximum of 8 replicas to keep the management and configuration
costs to a tolerable level.
The number of queries is about 10% of the network size in the NEWSCAST case,
while the basic-shuffling has about a 30% advantage. In this test, the implemen-
tation of the PSS makes the difference. The worse results achieved by NEWSCAST
are due to the higher CC that tends to produce a much higher number of false
positive suspicions. The CC distribution is far from being uniform, thus many
well-behaving nodes suspect non-malicious neighbors.
Clearly, the adoption of multiple TRUSTED PROMPTs allows a uniform distri-
bution of the queries among the trusted nodes. This load balancing can be eas-
ily obtained by selecting randomly a TRUSTED PROMPT, as the current available
TRUSTED PROMPTs are advertised by any of their reply messages.
When considering the scalability of our approach, one may come to think that
the TRUSTED PROMPT is going to be a source of problems. However, we have
found that on average, the TRUSTED PROMPT receives a manageable number of
queries per cycle. Because of the periodicity independence of our approach, we
conclude that having a single TRUSTED PROMPT is not a concern for a large net-
work, as we can choose the cycle time scale according to the actual network
requirements. Of course, the service should be highly available, which can be
established through traditional (lazy) replication techniques.
Finally, in Figure 5.4 we consider an extreme case in which a set of colluding
attackers larger than the cache size (c = 20) is involved. This scenario is very
unlikely because the attackers must be colluding by definition of the hub attack.
Notice that we have excluded from our model the possibility of a Sybil [Dou02]
attack and due to other simple ID scheme we have supposed that every PSS in-
stance is running on a distinct host (see Section 2.2 and 3.2).
We considered 50, 100 and 200 malicious nodes corresponding respectively to
2.5, 5 and 10 times the actual cache size of the underlying PSS. With 50 attackers
the SPSS still provides a good defence as the cache pollution level is about 15%, a
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Figure 5.4: SPSS dealing with more than cachesize (c = 20) malicious nodes.
The results regarding 50, 100 and 200 attackers are shown.
quite safe value and far from the risk of partitioning if the attackers leave.
Switching to 100 attackers, the situation changes dramatically. The pollution
level is exponentially higher; the SPSS takes 500 rounds to achieve a pollution
level of about 88%. Of course, the system is exposed to the risk of (massive)
partitioning at any time. However, the SPSS curve is decreasing showing that
the SPSS is reacting to the threat; although, the reaction is too slow to have any
practical impact.
The upper line corresponds to the 200 attackers set. In this case, the SPSS is
quickly defeated and seems incapable of any reaction.
In this unlikely scenario however, the SPSS shows to able to manage safely a
set of colluding attackers larger than 2.5 times the size of the its current cache.
Chapter 5. Proposed approach: the Secure Peer Sampling Service 81
5.5 Decentralised SPSS
We believe that the main shortcoming of our centralised SPSS solution is that
the deployment of trusted nodes over the Internet, in order to sustain our secure
gossip system, is a viable approach only for organisations or companies with
trusted administrative control.
In other words, the TRUSTED PROMPT approach requires some extra trusted
infrastructure that complicates the system deployment and maintenance. Using
the simplest set-up, i.e., using a single TRUSTED PROMPT, we minimise the deploy-
ment issue, but produce a single point of failure. If the single TRUSTED PROMPT is
hacked or crashes then the whole network is vulnerable to attack.
A fully decentralised solution would be preferred as it would lower the bur-
den to design and to deploy secure gossip systems and would not require trust
external to the system (other than the CA which is external to the protocol), but
is this possible to achieve? And what kind of trade-offs do we need to consider?
Our aim is to refactor our previous approach in order to obtain a fully decen-
tralised solution, in which each node has the chance to detect the malicious nodes
using its own resources.
5.5.1 Multiple overlays
As we have seen the main obstacle to prevent and detect the hub attack is repre-
sented by its high spreading speed. Such a high speed leaves no time to the peers to
make any successful guess about the identity of the attackers. This is why in our
previous SPSS solution we rely on the TRUSTED PROMPT assistance.
The basic idea for the fully distributed SPSS is based on using multiple, con-
current instances of the PSS. Therefore, each node participates in multiple over-
lay graphs, and the neighborhood at every instance will be distinct with very high
probability because the overlays have independently random-like topologies. Es-
sentially, the multiple caches over the same node population, which every node
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adopts, give each peer a snapshot of what is going on in distinct (random) neigh-
borhood of the overlay. We call extra caches the set of caches belonging to each
peer; every cache in the set is a random snapshot of a distinct PSS overlay
We assume the same attack model as before: a set of k colluding attackers, but
running multiple PSS instances as well, will pollute all the available instances.
This hypothesis makes our scenario more challenging.
Each node can monitor the pollution ratio by looking at its extra caches. Since
the network population of all the PSS instances is the same, all the extra caches
will become polluted by the same k malicious node IDs, if no checking action is
performed. However, an attacker can pollute at most only a single node’s cache
at a time per overlay. In addition, due to the random nature of the available
overlays, it is very unlikely that an attacker could defeat all caches of the same
victim peer in a short time window. Essentially, the multiple caches are useful in
order to perceive how malicious node are spreading the infection from distinct
directions over distinct overlays. Due to the spreading infection, we expect that
common node ID patterns will emerge in all (or in the majority) of the caches.
5.5.2 Quality rating
Each peer can build a set of statistics in order to guess or detect who are the
malicious nodes from the emerging patterns. This knowledge base is stored as
private, local black- and white-lists that it is never exchanged among neighbors
(see [NCW05]). This obviates the second-order issue of malicious nodes spread-
ing incorrect reputation information.
During a gossip exchange, both parties rate the quality of the exchange. The qual-
ity rate is given by the number of items lying in the intersection of the exchanged
caches among node A and B: r = |{cacheA ∩ cacheB}|, as described in Section 5.1.
This quality rate influences the probability to conclude the gossip exchange with
this current neighbor. Essentially, when two caches are similar (or identical) it is
likely that the current neighbor is a malicious node and with high probability it
should not be accepted. The probability to abort the exchange is proportional to
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Figure 5.5: Schematic of the decentralised SPSS; it maintains multiple caches to
support multiple random overlays. Black and white-lists screen incoming gossip
requests and refreshmalicious cache entries. The highest quality cache is mapped
to the API to support standard peer sampling functions.
the fraction of the common IDs found among the two caches: r/c, where c is the
usual cache size.
The rank results are collected in the node’s knowledge base. The information
collected in this structure is refreshed according to an ageing policy to avoid that
any wrong guess would have unbounded consequences over time.
Any attempt to exchange with a neighbor (black-) listed as a high frequency
and low quality rated node is declined. In addition, when a node suspects one of
its caches is polluted, it tries to refresh the cache randomness by substituting the
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currently blacklisted node IDs with high quality rated node IDs collected during
the previous exchanges (if any).
During the protocols execution, one or more cache can be defeated by the
attackers. However, this is not critical, as the cache will be restored as soon as the
node has collected a suitable knowledge base. It is very unlikely that all node’s
caches become polluted in a short amount of time; in this unlucky condition and
if the knowledge base is not ready or not correct, the only chance for a node is to
be contacted by a well behaving node in order to partially restore at least one of
its caches. This is the exact situation we have in the previous SPSS version. Figure
5.5 shows a schematic of the main components maintained by the protocol within
each node. A 5 caches scenario is depicted.
5.5.3 The algorithm
Our decentralised approach is focused on the knowledge base each node has
to build. Essentially, the knowledge base is represented by two list structures:
BLACKLIST andWHITELIST; the former holds high frequency and low quality rated
node IDs, while the latter holds high quality rated node IDs. We do not set any
explicit size limit for these structures and, as a consequence, their size may grow
to the actual network size. However, due to presence of an ageing policy, their ac-
tual size is much less than the theoretical maximum. The SPSS algorithm pseudo-
code executed by a node A is the following:
1. Select a random neighbor B /∈ BLACKLIST, if any
2. Compute the quality rate r with B; proportionally to r/c decline and black-
list B, otherwise accept the gossip exchange, and:
(a) whitelist B
(b) perform the standard PSS exchange with B
These steps are performed in each cycle for every available cache. Two addi-
tional actions are performed concurrently by two threads at the end of each cycle.
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The first action is to purge the BLACKLIST and WHITELIST according to an ageing
policy; the second action instead, is to repopulate the caches suspected of being
polluted (if any): each node ID in the cache listed in the BLACKLIST is substituted
by a random node ID picked from the WHITELIST.
Another issue is to clarify how node IDs can be inserted and swapped from the
BLACKLIST to the WHITELIST and vice-versa. When a node ID has to be inserted
in the BLACKLIST for the first time, a standard TTL value (2 cycles) is bound to
the stored ID; if the ID is already present instead, its TTL value is reinforced (i.e.,
doubling the current TTL value). This reinforcement process is needed in order
to keep in the BLACKLIST the most frequent node IDs (with a poor rate).
About swapping the IDs among the two structures, suppose node B’s ID
is already in node A’s WHITELIST, but now node A had to insert B’s ID into
its BLACKLIST. B’s ID is removed from A’s WHITELIST and it is inserted in the
BLACKLIST. In other words, the BLACKLIST has more authority than the WHITELIST.
Likewise, if node A has to whitelist node B’s ID, but it is already in A’s
BLACKLIST, the swap between the two list is not allowed until B’s ID is purged
from the BLACKLIST. This rule is designed to avoid that a node’s PSS instance ex-
changing with a malicious node for the first time, would not overwrite a possible
correct suspicion made by a more experienced instance.
5.5.4 Why it works
It is important to note that having multiple caches belonging to distinct PSS in-
stances is very different from having a single PSS with a possibly huge cache.
Multiple caches add extra randomness to the node’s state and avoid to be de-
feated in just one exchange; in addition, in extreme conditions (i.e., when the set
of attackers is larger than the cache size, see section 5.6.4) they still give the chance
to identify the attackers.
The value added by multiple PSS overlays is that the infection proceeds from
distinct multiple paths. These dynamics gives each peer more time to detect the
most frequent node IDs that appear in their caches.
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A higher-level protocol working on top of this fully distributed SPSS can see
just a single cache, in order tomaintain a seamlessly integrationwith the standard
PSS API. A smart implementation of the fully distributed SPSS can dynamically
export the current best cache according to concentration of suspected malicious
nodes currently listed in the knowledge base (see Figure 5.5).
5.5.5 Evolutionary link
The multiple caching concept originates from previous socially inspired evolu-
tionary models of “group selection” [HE05, HA06]. In these models anti-social
behavior between nodes was avoided by allowing nodes to form and move be-
tween different clusters or groups in the population based on utility value com-
parisons. Essentially, nodes evaluated the quality of their neighbors by measur-
ing the effectiveness of interaction with them over time – involving some appli-
cation level task – and represented this as a utility value. By comparing utili-
ties with other randomly selected nodes and copying the neighborhoods (caches)
of those with higher utility, nodes could avoid interaction with anti-social free-
riding nodes. In this approach nodes maintained a single overlay and made
intra-overlay movements to find better (higher utility) neighborhoods.
For the distributed SPSS we implemented a similar scheme by allowing each
node to store multiple caches and only selecting the best cache based on a mea-
sure of utility expressed as cache quality. From the point of view of what is passed
to the API, nodes are constantly shifting between different views of the network
since each cache represents a different set of neighbors. Furthermore, when the
quality for a particular cache becomes low due to possible identification of ma-
licious information, it is wiped and reinitialised from the white-list, hence low
quality caches are dropped.
Hence in SPSS nodes do not move between distinct groups or clusters in a
single overlay butmaintain and effectivelymove between distinct overlays (inter-
overlay movement) comprising the same population of nodes but in different
topological configurations. Hence what is being selected here by each node is the
Chapter 5. Proposed approach: the Secure Peer Sampling Service 87
overlay which produces the best cache quality at each given point in time. Since
all nodes actually stay in all overlays at all times (by maintaining a fixed number
of multiple caches) this approach is less a form of evolution and more a form of
redundancy with dynamic selection.
5.6 Fully decentralised SPSS evaluation
In order to evaluate our new approach, we investigate the following main issues:
(a) how much time is required to achieve a tolerable1 amount of pollution in the
node’s caches, (b) how many extra caches are required to prevent the attack, (c)
how the performance scales according to the number of the extra caches adopted,
(d) the performance of our approach in terms of communication cost; finally, we
are also interested in (e) the performance when the hub attack is played by a
number of malicious nodes larger than k or, in other words, when k > c.
If not stated explicitly, in the following evaluation, we consider the usual sce-
nario for a hub attack: when the number of malicious nodes k is equal to the
(single) cache size (k = c = 20).
5.6.1 Static environment
Figure 5.6 shows the average pollution level in the node’s caches for each consid-
ered network size (1,000, 5,000 and 10,000 nodes respectively). In this scenario,
we consider a static network in which both malicious and well-behaving nodes
are not subject to crashes; also network links are considered perfect and without
message loss.
Each plot shows a SPSS set-up using a distinct number of concurrent caches
per node; we have shown the results for 1, 2, 4 and 8 caches set-ups. As a refer-
ence, we also plotted what happens when no attack countermeasures are taken
1We consider the pollution in a tolerable range if the graph does not split into clusters when
the malicious nodes leave.
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Figure 5.6: Fully decentralised SPSS algorithm. The average pollution level in the
caches is shown over time; multiple distinct caches per node are compared (e.g.,
1, 2, 4 and 8 caches) for each network size (e.g., 1,000, 5000 and 10,000 nodes). 20
malicious nodes are involved in the attack.
(see the solid topmost line in each chart). Of course, when nothing prevents the
malicious node’s activities, the cache pollution level quickly reaches 100%. When
the distributed SPSS is run with just one cache, the pollution level monotonically
increases; the smaller network becomes defeated in about 50 cycles because a de-
gree of 20 is quite high compared to its size. However, this set-up cannot be con-
sidered a full countermeasure since we still use only a single cache. Essentially,
the blacklist mechanism is not sufficient per se in order to recover the network.
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By using two or more concurrent caches per node, the situation changes dra-
matically. Two caches are already sufficient to recover the network, regardless
the network size. In all cases, the pollution level is never dangerous. Here, by
dangerous, we refer to a level over which the network would suffer from parti-
tioning if the malicious nodes leave the network; in general, this happens when
the cache pollution is≥ 75% (see [JGGvS06]). By increasing the number of caches,
we further lower the pollution, however, especially in the bigger network, the ad-
vantage in the adoption of 8 instead of 4 concurrent caches is almost negligible.
In addition, a pollution level below 20% does not pose any threat of partitioning
the network. For this reason, according to our experiments, we consider the 4
extra caches set-up a good trade-off between complexity and effectiveness.
5.6.2 Dynamic environment (churn)
Figure 5.7 shows the performance of the SPSS under churn. We measured the
average pollution level in the node’s caches for each distinct network size (1,000,
5,000 and 10,000 nodes). We allowed three distinct churn set sizes: 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively; this amount of nodes leaves the network at every cycle and
it is substituted by an equal number of new participants. The malicious nodes,
however, stay in place and attempt to pollute caches for the whole duration of the
experiment. Note that these values are actually quite high [MCR03], but will al-
low to demonstrate the feasibility of our solution. Each node has a 4 extra caches
set-up.
It is surprising to see that the dynamism of the network helps the SPSS to keep
the pollution level low. In fact, the level is lower than in the static scenario, for
all the considered network sizes. In addition, a higher level of dynamism cor-
responds to a lower level of pollution. The reason lies in the fact that there is a
higher proportion of fresh nodes injected in the system with a very low proba-
bility of having a malicious ID in cache; the well-behaving nodes that work in
system for a longer time, will hardly diffuse the malicious IDs as they have al-
ready blacklisted them with high probability. Therefore, it becomes harder and
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Figure 5.7: Fully decentralised SPSS under churn conditions. The average pollu-
tion level in the caches is shown over time according to three churn set sizes (1%,
5% and 10% of the network population) and for each network size (e.g., 1,000,
5000 and 10,000 nodes). 4 concurrent caches are adopted by each participant. 20
malicious nodes are involved in the attack.
harder for the malicious nodes to diffuse their bogus caches.
Essentially, on average no well-behaving node will play in the system enough
time to detect successfully all malicious nodes, but this total knowledge is not
required at all. The knowledge of who are the malicious nodes is distributed
over the system as a whole; in other words, it is sufficient that every attacker is
known by some healthy node.
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Figure 5.8: Comparison among our previous TRUSTED PROMPT based SPSS and
the current decentralised one (4 extra caches). Two distinct churn scenarios are
shown for each one. Network size is 10,000.
In Figure 5.8, we show a comparison between our previous TRUSTED PROMPT
based SPSS and the new decentralised one in the dynamic environment. The set-
up of the decentralised SPSS consist of 4 extra caches. We adopted two churn set
sizes: 1% and 10% of the network population. The lines marked with the sym-
bols+,× and ∗ depicts the decentralised SPSS, while the standard lines depict the
TRUSTED PROMPT version. The cache pollution levels achieved are quite similar.
The new version has a small disadvantage when the churn rate is low (e.g., 1%).
However, in the worst case the pollution reaches a stable 10% and it is far from a
critical range. In other words, we do not run the risk to have the network parti-
tioned if the malicious nodes leave. In general, the decentralised SPSS achieves a
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more stable pollution level than the centralised version.
5.6.3 Message overhead
The main advantage of the decentralised version over the TRUSTED PROMPT based
one, is theminimalmessage traffic cost. Essentially, the extra cost to sustain is due
to the collection of extra PSS instances involved in the new approach. In fact, we
avoid the traffic generated by the queries sent to the TRUSTED PROMPT (e.g., about
1,000 of queries per cycle in a 10,000 nodes network).
Using NEWSCAST as implementation, the cost is n times the cost of each PSS
instance; as the average number of exchanges per node can be modelled by the
random variable 1+φ (see [JKvS03]), where φ has a Poisson distribution with
parameter 1; the overall node cost per cycle is:(
n∑
i=1
PSSi
)
=
(
n∑
i=1
1+ φi
)
= 2 · n
5.6.4 Extreme conditions
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of the graph topology properties in distinct scenarios.
The clustering coefficient is shown in the left picture, while the avg. path length
is shown in the right one. Network size is 10,000.
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We are interested in verifying the tolerance limit of our approach in terms of
number of colluding attackers and to make a comparison with the centralised
approach. In the previous section we have seen that the decentralised SPSS can
recover the overlay when k = c malicious nodes and n ≥ 2 caches are involved.
This performance is given by the redundancy of the node’s state. The experi-
ments shown in Figure 5.9 depict the performance of the (decentralised) SPSS
when k > cmalicious nodes are involved in a 10,000 nodes network.
Figure 5.9(a) shows what happens in the extreme case in which k = c · n
attackers are injected in the network. Essentially, we consider to pollute all the
extended state of the node. As before, we consider c = 20 the size of a single
cache and n the number of caches adopted; we considered 2, 4 and 8 caches,
corresponding to 40, 80 and 160 malicious nodes respectively. The effect of the
presence of c·n attackers growsmuch faster than the benefit given by themultiple
caches.
We may come to think that having k = c · n attackers is the same as the single
cache case (k = c · 1, see Figure 5.6), but, instead, the multiple cache presence
allows the decentralised SPSS to slowly recover the network. However, the re-
covering process can be very slow and, more important, the pollution level grows
over the dangerous level, depicted by the thick horizontal line, with any number
of caches; if the attackers leave, the network will be severely partitioned. Basi-
cally, when the whole state can be polluted by a sufficiently large set of malicious
nodes, the performance is bad (i.e., the network can be partitioned), but the de-
centralised SPSS is not paralysed as it is still capable of detecting the attackers.
In Figure 5.9(b), we check how many malicious nodes can be tolerated by a
SPSS using 2 caches. We are interested to know the maximum number of attacker
we can successfully tolerate, according to the actual redundancy (caches), with-
out exceeding the threshold represented by the horizontal line. With this set-up,
the system can tolerate k = c · 1.5 = 30 malicious nodes. However, as can be
argued by the situation depicted in Figure 5.9(a), an increment of the state redun-
dancy (the number of the caches) has a less than linear increment in the number
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of tolerable attackers. When considering k = c · n attackers, the centralised ver-
sion is successful as the TRUSTED PROMPT handles the node states; therefore, the
node states can always benefit from an extra state help.
5.7 PSS properties maintenance
The aim of this section is to show if and how the SPSS preserves the standard PSS
topology properties. In other words, we are interested in checking if the topology
generated andmaintained by the SPSS can still be considered similar to a random
graph from node’s point of view.
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of the graph topology properties in distinct scenarios.
The clustering coefficient is shown in the left picture, while the avg. path length
is shown in the right one. Network size is 10,000.
Figure 5.10 compares the following scenarios: (a) the PSS during a hub attack,
(b) the PSS in normal conditions, (c) the SPSS (during a hub attack) and (d) an
ideal random graph generated by an oracle 2. All the graph topologies involved
2The plot of the ideal random graph depicts oscillations while it should be perfectly flat, as
it is produced by a static graph. The oscillations are produced by the measurement process;
this process considers a random subset of the graph at every cycle to speed-up the computation,
therefore producing a bit of variance in the values.
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have a degree of 20 (e.g., the (S)PSS cache size is 20).
Figure 5.10 (a) shows the avg. clustering coefficient among the four scenar-
ios. Scenario (a) quickly reaches a CC value close to 1 as a consequence of the
hub topology formation, while in normal conditions (scenario (b)) the CC value is
around 0.30 (e.g., the typical value of the NEWSCAST implementation). The value
achieved by the (c) SPSS scenario instead is lower and closer to a real random
graph set-up (d). The enhanced randomness is due to the TRUSTED PROMPT’s pro-
vided caches.
Figure 5.10 (b) shows the avg. path length among the four scenarios. Scenario
(a) initially depicts a behavior similar to the standard PSS until the attacker’s
action becomes dominant; then it drops to a value of 2 in 30-35 rounds. This value
is expected as it is characteristic of the hub topology. Contrary to our selected PSS
reference implementation, the SPSS achieves an avg. path length value very close
to that of an ideal random graph (e.g., scenario (c) versus (d)).
These features show that the SPSS resulting topology can still be considered a
random graph-like topology as it achieves better (lower) clustering characteristics
than our reference PSS implementation (NEWSCAST).
5.8 SPSS discussion
In this chapter we have provided a general solution scheme suitable for any PSS
implementation. The SPSS is based on a stochastic approach and achieves the
goal of maintaining the underlying topology despite the presence of a set of ma-
licious nodes playing the hub attack algorithm.
The SPSS scheme is designed tomaintain the PSS properties when the number
of (colluding) malicious nodes k is less or equal of the PSS cache size c, but it
proves also to be effective when the set of attackers is 2,5 times larger than the
cache size.
It is important to understand that the SPSS task is to maintain the underlying
topology only in presence of attackers. In other words, it cannot prevent any
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other malicious behavior running, for example, as a higher level protocol; this
protocol may eventually rely on the PSS. However, the fact of having a “secured”
PSS can slow down the malicious intent, but cannot prevent it for sure.
Chapter 6
Securing higher-level services
In this chapter, we focus on securing gossip services relying on the PSS facilities.
Our securing effort targets a specific problem: the corruption of the gossiped
information. Our aim is to limit the spreading of the corrupted information with
the minimum possible effort.
We identify a class of generic gossip algorithms to which we apply a gen-
eral, but effective technique, based on probabilistic checking, in order to limit the
spread of corrupted information. The adopted technique has been already used
with success in a different (wireless) context [GJGvS07].
6.1 The second problem introduction
From the conclusions of the previous chapter, we know that the SPSS preserves
the random graph topology from the malicious action of a set of colluding attack-
ers playing a generic attack model (e.g., the hub attack, 3). However, the SPSS can
not prevent any other malicious action carried out by the attackers at an higher-
level service, relying (or not) on the PSS facilities. For example, the attackers can
forge or corrupt messages in various ways and, although without having the un-
derlying topology control, can profit by their malicious actions in order to obtain
a better utility or other kind of advantages. Of course, these actions cannot be
prevented by the SPSS itself.
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Essentially, we focus on services relying on the PSS for connectivity. The issue
we want to address is to prevent the spreading of forged information in these
services. A new gossip primitive to extend the standard gossip scheme is the
solution scheme we would like to achieve. Extending the gossip scheme would
make easier to adapt many standard gossip protocols in order to provide more
secure services.
In order to define clearly our second problem, we have to deal with some
issues. Basically, we must define exactly the following: (1) what kind of security
or guarantee we would like to have, (2) in which exact context we would like to
operate or, in other words, which kind of gossip service class can we target?
6.1.1 The scenario
We focus our attention on a specific class of gossip services. Our target class
is made by generic information dissemination services that follow this simple
schema: each node A and B exchange respectively a set of items sA et sB and
both sets must be non-empty. We do not pose any restriction on the actual action
performed to produce the new node state (see 2.1). The actual neighbor selection
is performed in a random fashion. The neighbor is picked from an underlying
topology that is provided by the presence of a PSS instance. Therefore, we assume
each node also runs a PSS instance.
We consider an item as a generic representation for any protocol specific data
unit (e.g., event, advertisement, description, sensor datum, etc.). As items are
exchanged among peers, several copies of a single item may exist in the network.
An item can be uniquely identified by the node ID of its source node and by a
sequence number.
In this context, we consider that the attackers forge or corrupt the set of received
items in their cache; the set held in cache is then forwarded to a neighbor. The
reason for the malicious behavior may vary and is application dependent, but we
consider that the malicious behavior provides some specific advantage over the
other (non malicious) peers.
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In gossip overlays, the fast diffusion of the information is a remarkable prop-
erty, but it may become a side effect if malicious information is diffused instead.
In fact, a few attackers may be able to subvert the application behavior by pol-
luting the system with bogus information. Our goal is to limit the spread of the
corrupted items by the malicious nodes on behalf of other nodes.
As can be argued, the actual item corruption process is highly application
dependent.
In the absence of any mechanism to detect and remove corrupted items the
system is likely to be flooded by the action of the attackers. In order to secure the
system, the following issues must be addressed:
• Access control: the entry point to the system must be regulated. A Certifi-
cation Authority (CA) in order to certify a public key for each peer can be a
viable strategy. The CA intervention is required as a bootstrap step and has
no other impacts.
• Sender authentication: as in large-scale gossip networks the messages are
likely to “random-walk” across many other peers in order to reach a des-
tination; therefore, the receiving node cannot make assumptions about the
sender of the message or item. To uniquely identify the sender’s item, we
require each message to be signed by its original sender.
• Message integrity: as any message is likely to be forwarded among many
peers, it is easy for an attacker to corrupt any item. However, if the previous
requirement holds, any peer can check for the integrity of the received items
by verifying the digital signature of the item’s sender at any time.
The use of cryptography can trivially solve our aim to prevent any attempt
of forging the items. In fact, by checking all the items at every gossip exchange
would solve the problem. However, gossiping large amounts of items at a time
and havingmultiple services relying on this technique could have a severe impact
on the processing resources.
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do forever
wait(∆t)
neighbor = SELECTPEER()
SENDCACHE(neighbour)
neigborcache = RECEIVECACHE()
checkItems(neighborcache)
myCache.UPDATE(neighborcache)
do forever
n state = RECEIVECACHE()
SENDCACHE(n state.sender)
checkItems(neighborcache)
myCache.UPDATE(neighborcache)
(a) Active Thread (b) Passive Thread
Figure 6.1: The gossip scheme extended by the anti-forge checkItems() prim-
itive.
We have to stress that a typical PSS implementation seems to fit in the general
class we have identified. Of course, we can ask: why not to use the technique we are
introducing to prevent the hub attack as an option to the SPSS? The reason is due to
one of the assumptions of the hub attack: the attackers are colluding as they need
to share their secret keys to sign correctly the IDs in eachmessage. For this reason,
the technique we are introducing (see Section 6.2), based on cryptography, would
never detect any malicious action during a hub-attack.
6.2 The anti-forge technique
The techniquewe are going to use, has been already successfully adopted in order
to limit the spam of corrupted items in mesh of wireless routers [GJGvS07].
In our scenario we have a dynamic overlay topology (PSS) instead of a static
set of routers. This fact makes the diffusion of corrupted items faster than in the
wireless scenario.
Essentially, the anti forge technique aims to provide a new gossip primitive:
checkItems(). The primitive is designed to run before the merge phase of
the node’s state as shown in Figure 6.1. Both the checkItems() and the SPSS
checkIDs() (see Section 5.1) primitives follow the same design scheme, but
their actual algorithm is completely different.
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The key idea is that each peer performs a probabilistic integrity check over the
received item set according to a system-wide Pcheck checking parameter. This
features ensures the lightweight nature of this solution as it provides a very good
ratio among effectiveness and resource consumption (see [GJGvS07] and Section
6.3).
The integrity check involves the verification of the selected item’s digital sig-
nature. Only successfully verified items and not checked items are allowed to
be merged in the new peer’s state. Any invalid item, of course, is discarded. In
addition, valid items are marked with a checked flag.
The actual algorithm run by the anti-forge primitive is the following.
1. ∀ itemi with prob. Pcheck, verify digital signature of itemi
2. if itemi is valid, itemi ← checked
6.2.1 Corruption attack model
The design of the anti-forge technique has severe implications for how an attacker
can behave. Marking the items as checked can be considered as an incentive to
cooperate among nodes.
First, all peers are supposed to verify a certain amount of items according
to the Pcheck parameter; if an attacker refuses conform to this rule, it would raise
suspicion as it is easy to calculate howmany checked items a node should receive
in a cache exchange (e.g., related to Pcheck and the cache size).
Second, the application of the checked flag is under the responsibility of the
last forwarder. If a forwarder sends a checked item, he tells explicitly that he has
previously checked this item instance and the item is valid. Therefore, if by lying
we run the risk to raise suspicion if the receiving neighbor executes an integrity
check on that item. In this case the attacker would be trivially discovered and
banned from the system.
For these reasons, an attacker can corrupt all items with the exception of the
items marked as checked. Malicious nodes are supposed to be careful and
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Figure 6.2: Items discovery speed comparison among the overlay and wire-
less scenario. The speed is expressed in terms of cycles required to discover the
amount of distinct items on the x-axis by all the nodes. The network size is 10,000
nodes.
do not run the risk to be trivially discovered, thus they are forced to perform
integrity checks with Pcheck probability and to only corrupt items that are not
marked as checked.
Of course, the attacker’s power is much more limited.
6.3 Anti-forge technique evaluation
We tested the effectiveness of the anti-forge technique in our particular overlay
environment. Our goal is to check the effectiveness of the probabilistic check in
Chapter 6. Securing higher-level services 103
limiting the spread of the corrupted items in our overlay setup.
We perform our experiments over three distinct network sizes: 1000, 2500 and
10000 nodes. The underlying topology is managed by a PSS instance, therefore it
looks like a random graph from each peer’s point of view. Different concentra-
tions of malicious node are considered: 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 and 30%; here, the malicious
nodes act on the dissemination service only.
The actual gossip algorithm used as a dissemination service to diffuse the
items is basic-shuffling (see Section 2.2.2) tuned by a special setup; essentially,
the differences are in the following: (a) generic items are exchanged instead of
node IDs, (b) the set size of the exchanged items is equal to the item’s cache size
(the cache’s whole content is exchanged) and (c) the random peer selection is
performed by a PSS instance running on each node as well as the dissemination
service.
The cache size used by the item diffusion mechanism (basic-shuffling) is 50 or
100, while the PSS cache size c is set to 20. In the following, when we refer to the
generic term “cache”, we refer to the diffusion mechanism cache.
Figure 6.2 shows a brief summary of the difference in speed among our sce-
nario and the wireless scenario described in [GJGvS07], in which wireless routers
are arranged in a grid-like fashion (4 neighbors set-up). The speed is expressed in
terms of time (cycles) required to discover all the distinct items by all the nodes
in the system. The x-axis reports the actual number of distinct items injected
in the system. In addition, the dissemination service uses an item cache of size
50. In this experiment there are no attackers and hence no corrupted items; the
experiment is just to show the speed dominance of our set-up. The use of the
basic-shuffling as a diffusion algorithm is explained in [DvS06].
The wireless set-up is much slower than the PSS overlay; this fact is expected,
as the PSS provides a dynamic communication layer that spreads the information
faster. Not only does dynamism play an important role, but also the higher node
degree of the PSS topology is a great boost for performance.
Figure 6.3 shows the effect of the malicious nodes when they start corrupting
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Figure 6.3: Average cache pollution (percentage of corrupted items in the items
cache) according to network size (1,000, 2,500 and 10,000 nodes) and distinct val-
ues of Pcheck (%5, %10, %20, %30).
the entries. The attackers corrupt all the items they are exchanging with a neigh-
bor, except for the items marked as checked. The figures are generated after
500 cycles. Each figure shows the average percentage of corrupted items in each
node’s cache according to the network size and the checking probability value
(Pcheck = {5,10,20,30%}). In Figure 6.3(a) the size of the set of the attackers is 1%
of the network size, while in Figure 6.3(b) it is 5%. The levels of corrupted items
in the cache are very similar with both concentration of attackers (1 and 5%). Us-
ing the same proportion of attackers and the same checking probability Pcheck,
the smaller networks tends to be more polluted. This fact can be explained by the
degree of the underlying PSS topology; a degree of 20 in fact, is quite large for
a 1,000 nodes network and the corrupted items can be spread faster than in the
other network sizes and a higher Pcheck value is needed to limit the pollution. In
the bigger network instead, a 5% Pcheck value is fine to limit the corrupted items
to a negligible level (e.g., an average of 2% of the node’s item cache size).
The time required for the system to reach a stable pollution state in the item
cache is about 50 cycles in the worst case, corresponding to the smallest Pcheck
value as shown in Figure 6.4. The upper line in the figure shows how the number
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Figure 6.4: Time required to corrupt the node’s cache. The upper line shows
what happenswithout any checking attempt, while the other lines show a distinct
checking probability (e.g., Pcheck = 5, 10, 20 and 30%). The network size is 1,000
nodes.
of corrupted items in the cache increases until all node’s cache entries are cor-
rupted. Figure 6.4 depicts the situation regarding a 1,000 nodes network, but for
the other network sizes, the time-scale values are similar.
The main difference between our scenario and the wireless one described in
[GJGvS07], is how the corrupted items are distributed in the network. In our
set-up, the corrupted items tends to be uniformly distributed among the node’s
caches, while in the wireless one the items have a short range of influence (mea-
sured in hops). This is one of the reasons why the corrupted items spread for
a longer distance. We measure this distance in hops, each time a corrupted in-
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stance is exchanged, its hop counter is incremented. This process stops when the
corrupted item is discovered and discarded by the check mechanism.
Figure 6.5 shows our hops measurements in the bigger (10,000 nodes) net-
work. The picture on the left (Figure 6.5(a)) shows the hop distance travelled
over time according to distinct Pcheck values, while the picture on the right (Fig-
ure 6.5(b)) shows the hop distance travelled with distinct Pcheck values, according
to different malicious nodes concentrations (1 and 5%).
In Figure 6.5(a), the average hop distance travelled reaches a stable state in a
few cycles (e.g., 20). As the dissemination is faster and almost uniform among
all the peers in the network, the corrupted items travel more distance than in
the wireless context (see [GJGvS07]). Of course, without any check a corrupted
item will travel forever among peers as shown by the topmost line. The distance
travelled grows almost linearly.
Figure 6.5(b) depicts two distinct properties: (1) the average number of hops
(distance) traveled by corrupted items is inverse proportional to the actual Pcheck
probability value; (2) the distance results are independent from the number of
malicious nodes (1, 5, 10, 20 and 40% of the network size) in the system, as all
lines in the plot are almost identical.
6.4 A case study: evaluating the SPSS and the anti-
forge technique together
After having analysed the anti-forge technique in our overlay set-up, securing a
generic information dissemination service, we allow the presence of a malicious
PSS layer, in which malicious nodes play the hub attack.
Essentially, we are interested to see if and how the hub attack can increase the
malicious item diffusion rate spread by the dissemination service. In addition,
we show how the presence of both techniques can limit to a negligible level the
effect of the malicious nodes over both services.
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Figure 6.5: Hops distance travelled by corrupted items in a 10,000 nodes net-
work. The picture on the left shows the distance travelled over time according
to distinct Pcheck values; the 5% of malicious nodes have joined the network. The
figure on the right instead, shows the distance travelled with distinct Pcheck val-
ues, according to different malicious node concentrations (1, 5, 10, 20, 40%); the
plots overlap showing that the distance travelled is independent from the number
of malicious nodes.
6.4.1 Scenario
We evaluate our techniques in the following scenario.
All nodes in the network (10,000) run both the (S)PSS and the item dissemi-
nation service. We allow the presence of a set of malicious colluding attackers.
These malicious nodes run both the corresponding malicious versions of the ser-
vices. The fact of colluding does not add any strength to our specific item cor-
ruption mechanism, but it is a fundamental requirement for the hub attack (see
Section 3.2). The attacker set size k is very small: only 20 malicious nodes are
present in the system (k = c = 20). The reason why we believe a small set of
attackers is a realistic scenario, has been previously stated in Section 3.2.
Figure 6.6 shows the proliferation of forged items in the diffusion service
while a hub attack ismutating the PSS underlying topology into the hub topology.
Distinct Pcheck values (e.g., 0, 1, 5, 10%) are compared. The tremendous impact
108 Chapter 6. Securing higher-level services
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  50  100  150  200
Av
g.
 %
 o
f c
or
ru
pt
ed
 it
em
s 
in
 c
ac
he
Cycles
 P=0%
 P=5%
 P=10%
 P=20%
 P=30%
Figure 6.6: Average of corrupted items in node’s caches in a 10,000 nodes net-
work. Each node is running a PSS instance affected by a hub attack and an item
diffusion service in which malicious nodes corrupt the items they forward. 20 m.
nodes run the corresponding malicious version of both services. Distinct Pcheck
values are compared.
of the hub topology on the forged items diffusion is shown by all the plots in
the figure; less than 50 cycles are sufficient to fill the entire network with forged
items, regardless of whatever effort spent in the checking process. 50 cycles is the
amount of time required on average to build the hub topology.
Increasing the probability value has almost no effect, as just a few cycles of
delay are introduced before the total corruption of the items in the system. We
limit the maximum value of Pcheck to 30% as our aim is to keep the computational
burden low.
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The most surprising aspect is that this terrible situation can be introduced by
just 20 attackers (e.g., 0.2% of the network size); as soon as the hub topology
is completed, the power of malicious nodes increases exponentially. Therefore,
ensuring the underlying topology health is a primary concern in this scenario.
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Figure 6.7: Average of corrupted items in node caches in a 10,000 node network.
Each node is running a SPSS instance providing a defense for the hub attack and
an item diffusion service in which malicious nodes corrupt the items they for-
ward. 20 malicious nodes run the corresponding malicious version of both ser-
vices. Distinct Pcheck values are compared.
In Figure 6.7, the PSS is replaced by an SPSS run by every node. In this set-
up, when the diffusion layer performs no checks, the diffusion rate of the forged
items still pollute the entire network, but it proceeds much slower and in is simi-
lar to the results presented in Figure 6.4. Switching on the checking process leads
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to a stable state of the node’s cache pollution which is proportional to the actual
Pcheck value adopted. Also the time required to achieve the stable state is propor-
tional to Pcheck value; in the worst case (e.g., Pcheck = 5), 150 cycles are required.
It is easy to understand why the hub attack can speed up the diffusion of
forged items. The hub topology forces each well-behaving node to exchange its
cache with a malicious node at least once at every round. This process will flood
any ordinary node with forged items and the probabilistic check is not enough to
purge the information, unless using very high values of the Pcheck probability that
would have a computational impact close to a full checking strategy. Essentially,
the forged item’s diffusion during a hub attack can be avoided at the expense
of a higher CPU consumption in order to check all the item’s digital signatures.
However, this is exactly what we want to avoid, as we we are interested in a
lightweight approach.
The hypothesis of using a full item check strategy when the hub topology is
complete can be useful in this particular scenario only. For example, as the at-
tackers are few in number and they are colluding, they can change the item’s
corruption strategy and can produce forged items on behalf of the other mali-
cious nodes. Each forged item will be regularly signed with the corresponding
malicious node key leading to no suspicions by other nodes.
The key idea to protect the diffusion service is to first ensure the regular struc-
ture of the underlying overlay. In fact, the chance to travel along random paths
is a crucial aspect to ensure the effectiveness of the probabilistic item’s check ap-
proach. The SPSS is an ideal candidate to provide (a) the standard PSS features
(see Section 5.7) when a set of attackers strike a hub attack and (b) a secure sub-
strate on which other services can trust for their own activities.
Chapter 7
Related work
Some real-world applications have developed techniques to tolerate malicious
node behavior. In this context, the attackers exhibit selfish behavior and are usu-
ally referred as free-riders. Essentially, they tend to use the other peer resources
without returning any favour.
BitTorrent [bit] and Scrivener [NNS+05] adopt a reputation schemewhich pro-
motes the peers who have reciprocated in the past. The difference between the
two systems is that, in the former, the scheme is purely local, while the latter
uses a distributed reputation scheme. A reputation scheme is a critical compo-
nent and it has been show to be possibly subject to subversion, especially in its
distributed flavour. A recent work [HP05], suggests that the success of BitTor-
rent file sharing and its relative low amount of cheaters is mainly due to user’s
sociological aspects rather than to technological features. In fact, its reputation
algorithm seems easy to subvert. Stronger attempts to build a trusted distributed
reputation scheme have also been made (e.g., EigenTrust [KSGM03] ).
Splitstream [CDK+03] is a tree-based multicast protocol. It achieves load bal-
ancing by dividing the content in stripes and by using a distinct tree per stripe.
To circumvent free riders, Splitstream periodically rebuilds trees and nodes keep
a local reputation list regarding potentially malicious nodes.
BARGossip [LCW+06] is an interesting alternative gossip scheme. Using BAR
Gossip, the authors propose a multimedia streaming application that guaran-
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tees predictable throughput, low latency and deals with Byzantine,Altruistic and
Rational peers. BAR Gossip relies on two main primitives: (i) verifiable pseudo-
random neighbor selection and (ii) fair enough exchange. The first feature en-
sures that a gossip partner can verify that its selection is really (pseudo) random,
while the second feature promotes co-operation among selfish nodes.
In our context, we cannot let neighbors verify the random selection as each
node’s neighborhood is changing every round and the neighborhood size is lim-
ited. BAR gossip achieves this feature sacrificing dynamic membership: each
participant must register first at the broadcaster node before the streaming starts.
After the multimedia event is started, no nodes can join or leave. Essentially this
means that the BAR topology is a clique in which “everyone knows everyone”.
Again, as each node’s neighborhood is changing every round, it is very hard,
if not impossible, to build a reliable reputation scheme in our environment. In
fact, by the time reputation have settled, attackers would already have subverted
the network.
7.1 Attacks
In the following we present the most interesting attack approaches along with
their proposed solution (if any). Much of the emphasis is focused on structured
overlays, but very little attention has been paid to unstructured networks that are
probably even more sensitive [DKK+05].
7.1.1 Sybil attack
One of the first P2P-oriented attacks is the “Sybil” attack [Dou02]. In the Sybil
attack, any malicious peer can adopt many distinct identities and can therefore
control a substantial fraction of the system. The redundancy often adopted by
P2P systems to mitigate the presence of malicious peers does not help as it re-
quires the ability to distinguish whether two identities are actually different or
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not. The author shows that without a central authority, this malicious behavior
is always possible. The Sybil attack is still a cornerstone attack model in over-
lays, as there is no way to solve it in a distributed manner suitable for large-scale
overlays; in fact, a few extreme and unrealistic assumptions are required.
An obvious consequence of this attack model is the requirement to adopt a
Central Authority (CA) in order to provide a minimal level of trust to the system.
This level is minimal and not sufficient, as malicious peers can easily obtain dis-
tinct “legal” identities from the authority. Many solutions have been proposed to
solve or mitigate this issue. They are based on the idea of considering identities
as ”precious” resources and to force peers (or users) to pay (see [CDG+02]) or
to limit the number of identities issued over time. However, these mechanisms
tend to be very complicated and they have a non-negligible risk to be exploited
as well. What is worst, is that these approaches tend to discourage well-behaving
peers (or their users) from joining these overlays.
Two recent works [Bor06, YKGF06] however, seem promising; the first one
is based on computational puzzles; the second one, is based on the “social net-
work” among user identities. This novel scheme is based on the fact that an edge
between two nodes reflects a human-established trust relationship between the
users themselves. Malicious nodes instead, can hardly establish trust relation-
ships.
7.1.2 Eclipse attack
The Eclipse attack is focused on DHT overlays and proposed in [SCRD04]. It
is a generalisation of the Sybil attack. An attacker can use first a Sybil attack to
trigger an Eclipse attack by generating fake distinct peer identities to populate the
neighborhood of well-behaving nodes. Correct nodes are thus “eclipsed” from
the overlay. Any solution for the Sybil attack may be useless in this case, as the
Eclipse attack works at the overlay management layer. Essentially, it modifies
the topology by polluting the correct nodes neighborhood links; we adopted a
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similar approach in our attack model (see Section 3.2), but we have a different
underlying system model.
The authors also present a defence scheme based on degree auditing and they
claim their solution is general enough for unstructured overlays, but their evalu-
ation is focused only on structured overlays. However, in [NCW05] the authors
discourage using auditing because it is hardly manageable in a distributed fash-
ion and because the attackers can elude the sanctions generated by the auditing
process (e.g., using the Sybil [Dou02] attack). The approach we will propose (see
Chapter 5) to resist to our attack model instead, it is not based on distributed
auditing mechanisms.
A distributed auditing process is in general weak because it is based on artifi-
cial incentives (versus genuine incentives), a particular kind of incentives in which a
node has only to appear to co-operate. However, the design of genuine incentives
it is not always a viable solution and the algorithm designers are forced to adopt
the weaker kind of incentive. These categories are just an example of Distributed
Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) (see [SP03, NCW05]).
7.1.3 Poisoning attacks
The index poisoning attack [LNR06] focuses on lowering the information quality
of the indexes responsible to map hash keys to the current file locations. The poi-
soned indexes, for example, may bind the hash keys to random hosts addresses,
but also other strategies can be adopted. This simple approach works because
these P2P systems do not check the file advertisement locations. The approach
is suitable for both DHT (e.g., Overnet) and non DHT overlays (e.g., FastTrack).
The index poisoning affects the provided QOS by poisoning the application in-
formation (e.g., the indexes) rather than damaging the topology structure. Essen-
tially, the system is polluted by bogus high-rated entries, but the system struc-
ture (topology) is not affected. The author’s countermeasure based on rating the
sources works because it is assumed that the routing layer is still working fine.
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It is interesting to note that just one malicious node may poison a sufficient
number of high-rated entries to cause trouble. For example, this kind of attack
is used in real file-sharing systems by companies that are worried about the vio-
lation of their intellectual properties; downloading a famous artist mp3 or mpeg
file and listening or watching to an anti-piracy spot is not uncommon.
In [NR06] the authors combine the previous index poisoning attack with the
routing table poisoning in DHT file-sharing systems. This combination leads to
an effective DOS attack. The latter attack focuses on making the victim host an
overlay neighbor of many of the overlay participants. When a poisoned peer
forwards a message, it may select the victim host as the next neighbor. Due to
the millions of active peers in many P2P system, a significant fraction of peers
(“zombies”) tend to flood the victim host with messages. The victim may not be
part of the P2P system. As in our attack, the routing poisoning attack disrupts the
topology infrastructure, but, while in the latter the attackers are injected in ad-hoc
overlay positions 1 by the hacker, in our scenario the attackers have to climb up to
the leader position. The authors discuss some viable countermeasures based on
checking the source by contacting it, but we have seen in our case this approach
is not sufficient at all since the topology mutation is too fast.
7.1.4 Other attacks
In [BKS04], the authors propose a methodology to eliminate the vulnerabilities of
gossip-based multicasts to DOS attacks. The solution is based on low-level socket
techniques; it focuses on limiting and eliminating bogus message fragments, but
the system relies on a fixed neighborhood overlay. Essentially, it protects the in-
formation quality, but not the overlay infrastructure that allows the application
to work. In [WLC03] instead, the impact of overlay topology is analysed in order
to tolerate DOS attacks by hiding an application’s location. Different topologies
have distinct levels of effectiveness in a location hiding purpose. This paper en-
1Corresponding to the most preferred keys.
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forces our claim about the relevance of preserving the actual overlay topology.
In [JMB03] the authors propose a “frequency” attack in unstructured gossip-
ing networks in which attackers communicate more frequently than others and
diffuse illegal information very fast. Their defense is based on having an offline
Certification Authority (CA) and using an auditing scheme based on message his-
tory.
In [CDG+02], Castro et al. studied attacks aimed at preventing fair message
routing in DHT overlay (Pastry [RD01]). As we also did with our SPSS, they
identified their secure routing as a key building block that can be combined with
higher level services.
Chapter 8
Concluding remarks and future directions
Secure gossiping techniques are becoming increasingly necessary in P2P appli-
cations. The research presented in this thesis addresses the problem of devel-
oping gossip-based solutions for large-scale distributed systems, in the presence
of malicious nodes. This problem is difficult as it needs to be carried out in a
collaborative fashion.
In these kind of systems, in which no strict control on users and software
versions can be ensured, the presence of malicious nodes should be considered
the norm rather than the exception. Therefore, the design of P2P services and
protocols must deal with this new concept.
The attack model is based on the fact that each participant holds a small list of
references of other nodes, called cache. This cache structure is regularly updated
among nodes through message exchange (gossiping). In this manner, each node
is offered a fresh list of nodes participating in the network. In the attack model,
a small group of colluding attackers forge special messages such that entities al-
ways refer to a malicious node. The effect of this malicious behaviour is that the
attacker’s group isolates well-behaving nodes from the rest of the network. In the
second model, a smaller set of colluding nodes
In particular, we focused on securing a specific andwell known gossip service,
the Peer Sampling Service (PSS) from our generic attack model. We have shown
the severe consequences our simple attack model can lead to.
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In addition, the consequences of the attack are not limited to the PSS, but we
applied our work to other cases such as aggregation, (latency-aware) topology
management and optimal superpeer selection. These higher-level (gossip) ser-
vices, relying on the PSS, suffer tremendously from the attacker’s presence.
Our proposed solution, the Secure Peer Sampling Service (SPSS), is aimed to
be “elegant” in the sense of integrating nicely in the standard gossip scheme. It is
also robust and requires minimal effort to be carried out by well-behaving nodes.
Essentially, a trusted entity (TRUSTED PROMPT) is used to identify malicious nodes
using statistical analysis on reports sent by well-behaving nodes. The trusted
entity can also restore the state of attacked nodes.
A fully decentralised evolution - i.e., without the trusted entity - of this solu-
tion is also presented. By using multiple random overlays and extra data struc-
tures, each node is able to build its own suspicion statistics in order to detect the
malicious nodes with high probability.
It has been shown that our solution, the SPSS, is: (a) successful in reducing the
malicious node’s effect to a negligible level, (b) is abstracted by a basic primitive
function that fits in the standard gossip scheme and, (c), it can be fully decen-
tralised if required. In addition, the attack model we adopted can be considered
a threat not only for the PSS itself, but also for other services relying on it.
Finally, we have presented a second generic technique aimed to prevent the
diffusion of forged information in gossip diffusion services. We provided an ex-
ample scenario in which both the SPSS and this diffusion prevention technique
are combined to protect the system. This technique has been already applied in
an ad-hoc (wireless) context [GJGvS07], while in this work, it has been applied to
our overlay network scenario.
8.1 Future directions
The SPSS technique in particular is based essentially on a heuristic that has been
validated through simulation; however, future work is needed to achieve a better
Chapter 8. Concluding remarks and future directions 119
and more formal understanding of its working.
Future work may also involve the adoption of a real world implementation
prototype to verify the results achieved by simulation. A suitable environment
for the deployment can be the PlanetLab [NPB03] testbed.
References
[AKR+05] Micah Adler, Rakesh Kumar, Keith W. Ross, Dan Rubenstein,
Torsten Suel, and David. D. Yao. Optimal peer selection for p2p
downloading and streaming. In Proc. of IEEE Infocom, Miami, FL,
March 2005.
[BDT99] Eric Bonabeau, Marco Dorigo, and Guy Theraulaz. Swarm intelli-
gence: from natural to artificial systems. Oxford University Press, Inc.,
New York, NY, USA, 1999.
[bis] The bison project. http://www.cs.unibo.it/bison/.
[bit] Bittorrent. http://bitconjurer.org/BitTorrent/protocol.html.
[BKS04] Gal Badishi, Idit Keidar, and Amir Sasson. Exposing and eliminat-
ing vulnerabilities to denial of service attacks in secure gossip-based
multicast. TR CCIT 477, Department of Electrical Engineering, Tech-
nion, March 2004.
[Bor06] Nikita Borisov. Computational puzzles as sybil defenses. In Proc.
6th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P ’06),
pages 171–176, Washington, DC, USA, 2006. IEEE Computer Society.
[bri] Brite internet topology generator. www.cs.bu.edu/brite/.
[BS06] Salman A. Baset and Henning Schulzrinne. An analysis of the skype
peer-to-peer internet telephony protocol. In Proc. of INFOCOM’06,
Barcelona, Spain, April 2006.
References 121
[BT01] Paul Bettner and Mark Terrano. 1500 archers on a 28.8: Network
programming in age of empires. In Proc. 14th Game Developer Con-
ference (GDC), mar 2001.
[CDG+02] Miguel Castro, Peter Druschel, Ayalvadi Ganesh, Antony Rowstron,
and Dan S.Wallach. Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer over-
lay networks. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 36:299–314, 2002.
[CDHR02] Miguel Castro, Peter Druschel, Y. Charlie Hu, and Antony Row-
stron. Exploiting network proximity in distributed hash tables. In
Ozalp Babaoglu, Ken Birman, and Keith Marzullo, editors, Inter-
national Workshop on Future Directions in Distributed Computing (Fu-
DiCo), pages 52–55, June 2002.
[CDK+03] Miguel Castro, Peter Druschel, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Animesh
Nandi, Antony Rowstron, and Atul Singh. Splitstream: High-
bandwidth multicast in a cooperative environment. In Proc. 19th
ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP’03), October
2003.
[CDKR02] M. Castro, P. Druschel, A. Kermarrec, and A. Rowstron. SCRIBE:
A large-scale and decentralized application-level multicast infras-
tructure. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in communications (JSAC),
20(8):1489–1499, 2002.
[CJ05] Andrea Ceccanti and Gian Paolo Jesi. Building latency-aware over-
lay topologies with QuickPeer. In Proc. of the Joint International Con-
ference on Autonomic and Autonomous Systems and International Con-
ference on Networking and Services (ICAS/ICNS), pages 24–29, October
2005.
[CMAP04] M. Costa, M.Castro, A.Rowstron, and P.Key. Pic: Practical internet
coordinates for distance estimation. In Proc. of ICDCS’04, 2004.
122 References
[CRSZ01] Y. Chu, S. Rao, S. Seshan, and H. Zhang. Enabling conferencing
applications on the internet using an overlay multicast architecture.
In Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, pages 55–68, San Diego, CA, USA, August
2001.
[CRW01] A. Carzaniga, D. S. Rosemblum, and A. L. Wolf. Design and evalu-
ation of a Wide-Area event notification service. ACM Trans. on Com-
puter Systems, 19(3):332–383, August 2001.
[DBK+01] Frank Dabek, Emma Brunskill, M. Frans Kaashoek, David Karger,
Robert Morris, Ion Stoica, and Hari Balakrishnan. Building Peer-to-
Peer Systems With Chord, a Distributed Lookup Service. In Proc. of
8th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HOTOSVII), Schloss
Elmau, Germany, May 2001. IEEE Computer Society.
[DCKM04] Frank Dabek, Russ Cox, Frans Kaashoek, and Robert Morris. Vi-
valdi: A decentralized network coordinate system. In Proceedings of
the ACM SIGCOMM ’04 Conference, Portland, Oregon, August 2004.
[DGH+87] A. Demers, D. Greene, C. Hauser, W. Irish, J. Larson, S. Shenker,
H. Sturgis, D. Swinehart, and D. Terry. Epidemic algorithms for
replicated database management. In Proc. of the 6th Annual ACM
Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC87), pages
1–12, 1987.
[DKK+05] D. Dumitriu, E. Knightly, A. Kuzmanovic, I. Stoica, and
W. Zwaenepoel. Denial-of-service resilience in peer-to-peer file shar-
ing systems. In Proc of ACM Sigmetrics Conference, 2005.
[Dou02] John R. Douceur. The sybil attack. In Peter Druschel, M. Frans
Kaashoek, and Antony I. T. Rowstron, editors, IPTPS, volume 2429
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 251–260. Springer, 2002.
References 123
[DvS06] Spyros Voulgaris Daniela Gavidia andMaarten van Steen. A gossip-
based distributed news service for wireless mesh networks. In Proc.
3rd IEEE Conference on Wireless On demand Network Systems and Ser-
vices (WONS). IEEE Computer Society, January 2006.
[EGH+03] P.T. Eugster, R. Guerraoui, S. B. Handurukande, A.-M. Kermarrec,
and L. Massoulie´. Lightweight probabilistic broadcast. ACM Trans-
actions on Computer Systems, 21(4):341–374, 2003.
[EGKM04a] Patrick Eugster, Rachid Guerraoui, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, and
Laurent Massoulie´. From epidemics to distributed computing. IEEE
Computer, 37(5):60–67, May 2004.
[EGKM04b] Patrick T. Eugster, Rachid Guerraoui, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, and
Laurent Massoulie´. Epidemic information dissemination in dis-
tributed systems. IEEE Computer, 37(5):60–67, May 2004.
[fas] Fasttrack Home Page. http://www.fasttrack.nu.
[FJJ+99] P. Francis, S. Jamin, C. Jin, Y. Jin, V. Paxson, D. Raz, Y. Shavitt, and
L. Zhang. IDMaps: a global internet host distance estimation ser-
vice. In Proc. IEEE Infocom ’99, 1999.
[fre] The freepastry/simpastry simulators.
http://research.microsoft.com/ antr/Pastry/.
[GD98] Laurent Gautier and Christophe Diot. Design and evaluation of mi-
maze, a multi-player game on the internet. In Proc. International Con-
ference on Multimedia Computing and Systems, pages 233–236, June
1998.
[GJGvS07] Daniela Gavidia, Gian Paolo Jesi, Chandana Gamage, and Maarten
van Steen. Canning spam in gossip wireless networks. In Proc. 4th
IEEE Conference on Wireless On demand Network Systems and Services
(WONS), Obergurgl, Austria, January 2007.
124 References
[GKM01] Ayalvadi J. Ganesh, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, and LaurentMassoulie´.
Scamp: Peer-to-peer lightweight membership service for large-scale
group communication. In Jon Crowcroft and Marcus Hofmann, ed-
itors, Proceedings of the Third International COST264 Workshop (NGC
2001), number LNCS 2233 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 44–55, London, UK, November 2001. Springer-Verlag.
[Gnu] Gnutella web site. http://gnutella.wego.com.
[HA06] David Hales and Stefano Arteconi. Slacer: A self-organizing pro-
tocol for coordination in p2p networks. IEEE Intelligent Systems,
21(2):29–35, March / April 2006.
[HE05] David Hales and Bruce Edmonds. Applying a socially-inspired
technique (tags) to improve cooperation in p2p networks. IEEE
Transactions in Systems, Man and Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Hu-
mans, 35(3):385–395, 2005.
[HP05] David Hales and Simon Patarin. Feature: Computational sociology
for systems “in the wild”: The case of bittorrent. In IEEE Distributed
Systems Online, volume 6, 2005.
[JAB01] M. Jovanovic, F. Annexstein, and K. Berman. Scalability issues in
large peer-to-peer networks - a case study of gnutella. Technical
report, University of Cincinnati, Department of Computer Science,
2001.
[JB05] Ma´rk Jelasity and Ozalp Babaoglu. T-Man: Gossip-based overlay
topology management. In Proceedings of Engineering Self-Organising
Applications (ESOA’05), July 2005.
[JGGvS06] Gian Paolo Jesi, Daniela Gavidia, Chandana Gamage, and Maarten
van Steen. A secure peer sampling service. UBLCS 2006-17, Univer-
sity of Bologna, Dept. of Computer Science, May 2006.
References 125
[JGJ+00] J. Jannotti, D. K. Gifford, K. L. Johnson, M. F. Kaashoek, and
J. O’Toole. Overcast: Reliable multicasting with an overlay network.
In Proc. 4th Symposium on Operating SystemDesign and Implementation
(OSDI), pages 197–212, Oct 2000.
[JGKvS04] Mark Jelasity, Rachid Guerraoui, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, and
Maarten van Steen. The peer sampling service: Experimental eval-
uation of unstructured gossip-based implementations. In Proc. of
the 5th International Middleware Conference, Toronto, Canada, Octo-
ber 2004.
[JKvS03] Ma´rk Jelasity, Wojtek Kowalczyk, andMaarten van Steen. Newscast
computing. Technical Report IR-CS-006, Vrije Universiteit Amster-
dam, Department of Computer Science, Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands, November 2003.
[JM04] Ma´rk Jelasity and Alberto Montresor. Epidemic-Style Proactive Ag-
gregation in Large Overlay Networks. In Proceedings of the 24th In-
ternational Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS’04),
pages 102–109, Tokyo, Japan, March 2004. IEEE Computer Society.
[JMB03] Ma´rk Jelasity, Alberto Montresor, and Ozalp Babaoglu. Towards
secure epidemics: Detection and removal of malicious peers in
epidemic-style protocols. Technical Report UBLCS-2003-14, Univer-
sity of Bologna, Department of Computer Science, Bologna, Italy,
November 2003. presented at FuDiCo II: S.O.S, Bertinoro, Italy, June,
2004.
[JMB04] Ma´rk Jelasity, Alberto Montresor, and Ozalp Babaoglu. A modu-
lar paradigm for building self-organizing peer-to-peer applications.
In Giovanna Di Marzo Serugendo, Anthony Karageorgos, Omer F.
Rana, and Franco Zambonelli, editors, Engineering Self-Organising
126 References
Systems: Nature-Inspired Approaches to Software Engineering, num-
ber 2977 in Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages 265–282.
Springer-Verlag, April 2004.
[JMB05] Ma´rk Jelasity, Alberto Montresor, and Ozalp Babaoglu. Gossip-
based aggregation in large dynamic networks. ACM Trans. Comput.
Syst., 23(1):219–252, 2005.
[JMB06] Gian Paolo Jesi, AlbertoMontresor, and Ozalp Babaoglu. Proximity-
aware superpeer overlay topologies. In Jean-Philippe Martin-Flatin
Alexander Keller, editor, Self-Managed Networks, Systems and Ser-
vices, number 3996 in LNCS, pages 43–57, Dublin, Ireland, June 2006.
Springer. Best Paper Award.
[kaz] Kazaa Home Page. http://www.kazaa.com.
[KMG03] Anne-Marie Kermarrec, LaurentMassoulie´, and Ayalvadi J. Ganesh.
Probabilistic reliable dissemination in large-scale systems. IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 14(3), March 2003.
[KRAV03] Dejan Kostic, Adolfo Rodriguez, Jeannie Albrecht, and Amin Vah-
dat. Bullet: high bandwidth data dissemination using an overlay
mesh. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM symposium on Operating systems
principles, pages 282–297. ACM Press, 2003.
[KSGM03] Sepandar D. Kamvar, Mario T. Schlosser, and Hector Garcia-Molina.
The eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in p2p net-
works. In Proc. 12th International Conference on World Wide Web
(WWW ’03), pages 640–651, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM Press.
[LCW+06] H. Li, A. Clement, E. Wong, J. Napper, I. Roy, L. Alvisi, and
M. Dahlin. BAR gossip. In Proceedidings of the 2006 USENIX Op-
erating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), November 2006.
References 127
[LL04] Li-wei Lehman and Steven Lerman. Pcoord: Network position es-
timation using peer-to-peer measurements. In Proc. 3rd International
Conference on Network Computing and Applications (NCA ’04), vol-
ume 00, pages 15–24, Washington, DC, USA, 2004. IEEE Computer
Society.
[LNR06] Jian Liang, Naoum Naoumov, and Keith Ross. The index poisoning
attack in p2p file sharing systems. In Proc. of INFOCOM, Barcelona,
Spain, April 2006. IEEE.
[LRW03] Nathaniel Leibowitz, Matei Ripeanu, and Adam Wierzbicki. De-
constructing the kazaa network. In Proc. 3rd IEEE Workshop on Inter-
net Applications (WIAPP ’03), page 112, Washington, DC, USA, 2003.
IEEE Computer Society.
[MCR03] Ratul Mahajan, Miguel Castro, and Antony I. T. Rowstron. Con-
trolling the cost of reliability in peer-to-peer overlays. In M. Frans
Kaashoek and Ion Stoica, editors, Proc. of IPTPS, volume 2735 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 21–32. Springer, 2003.
[MJB04] Alberto Montresor, Ma´rk Jelasity, and Ozalp Babaoglu. Robust ag-
gregation protocols for large-scale overlay networks. In Proceedings
of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Net-
works (DSN’04), pages 19–28, Florence, Italy, June 2004. IEEE Com-
puter Society.
[Mon04] Alberto Montresor. A robust protocol for building superpeer over-
lay topologies. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on
Peer-to-Peer Computing, pages 202–209, Zurich, Switzerland, August
2004. IEEE Computer Society.
[NCW05] S. Nielson, S. Crosby, and D. Wallach. A taxonomy of rational at-
tacks. In Proc. of IPTPS, Ithaca, NY, february 2005.
128 References
[NNS+05] Animesh Nandi, Tsuen-Wan “Johnny” Ngan, Atul Singh, Peter
Druschel, and Dan S. Wallach. Scrivener: Providing incentives
in cooperative content distribution systems. In Proceedings of the
ACM/IFIP/USENIX 6th International Middleware Conference (Middle-
ware 2005), Grenoble, France, November 2005.
[NPB03] Akihiro Nakao, Larry Peterson, and Andy Bavier. A Routing Under-
lay for OverlayNetworks. Technical Report PDN–03–012, PlanetLab
Consortium, April 2003.
[NR06] Naoum Naoumov and Keith Ross. Exploiting p2p systems for ddos
attacks. In InfoScale 2006: Proceedings of the 1st international conference
on Scalable information systems, page 47, New York, NY, USA, 2006.
ACM Press.
[NZ02] T. Ng and H. Zhang. Predicting internet network distance with
coordinates-based approaches. In Proc. 21th IEEE Infocom. IEEE, June
2002.
[PB02] Peter R. Pietzuch and Jean Bacon. Hermes: A distributed event-
based middleware architecture. In Proc. of the 22nd International Con-
ference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCSW ’02), pages 611–
618, Washington, DC, USA, 2002. IEEE Computer Society.
[peea] Peercast P2P Radio. http://www.peercast.org.
[peeb] Peersim Peer-to-Peer Simulator. http://peersim.sf.net.
[RD01] Antony Rowstron and Peter Druschel. Pastry: Scalable, decentral-
ized object location and routing for large-scale peer-to-peer systems.
In Proc. 18th IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems
Platforms (Middleware), pages 329–350, November 2001.
References 129
[RFH+01] S. Ratnasamy, P. Francis, M. Handley, R. Karp, and S. Shenker.
A scalable content-addressable network. In Proc. of ACM SIG-
COMM’01, pages 161–172, 2001.
[RHKS02] S. Ratnasamy, M. Handley, R. Karp, and S. Shenker. Topologically-
aware overlay construction and server selection. In Proc. 21th IEEE
Infocom. IEEE Computer Society, June 2002.
[SCRD04] Atul Singh, Miguel Castro, Antony Rowstron, and Peter Druschel.
Defending against eclipse attacks on overlay networks. In Proc. of the
11th ACM SIGOPS European Workshop, Leuven, Belgium, September
2004.
[SGB+03] Nathan Sheldon, Eric Girard, Seth Borg, Mark Claypool, and Em-
manuel Agu. The effect of latency on user performance in Warcraft
3. In Proc. of the 2nd Workshop on Network and System Support for
Games, pages 3–14, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM Press.
[SH06] Atul Singh and Mads Haahr. Creating an adaptive network of hubs
using schelling’s model. Commun. ACM, 49(3):69–73, 2006.
[Sky] Skype home page. http://www.skype.com/.
[SP03] Jeffrey Shneidman andDavid C. Parkes. Rationality and self-interest
in peer to peer networks. In 2nd Int. Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
(IPTPS’03), 2003.
[The] Freenet. http://freenet.sourceforge.net.
[unr] Unreal networking protocol notes by tim sweeney.
http://unreal.epicgames.com/Network.htm.
[VGvS05] Spyros Voulgaris, Daniela Gavidia, and Maarten van Steen. Cyclon:
Inexpensive membership management for unstructured p2p over-
lays. Journal of Network and Systems Management, 13(2), 2005.
130 References
[WLC03] J. Wang, L. Lu, and A. Chien. Tolerating denial-of-service attacks
using overlay networks – impact of overlay network topology. In
Proc. ACM Workshop on Survivable and Self-Regenerative Systems, Oct
2003.
[YGM03] Beverly Yang and Hector Garcia-Molina. Designing a super-peer
network. In Proc. 19th IEEE International Conference on Data Engineer-
ing (ICDE’03), volume 00, page 49, 2003.
[YKGF06] Haifeng Yu, Michael Kaminsky, Phillip B. Gibbons, and Abraham
Flaxman. Sybilguard: defending against sybil attacks via social net-
works. In SIGCOMM ’06: Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Appli-
cations, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communi-
cations, pages 267–278, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM Press.
[ZS04] Serafeim Zanikolas and Rizos Sakellariou. Towards a monitor-
ing framework for worldwide grid information services. In Marco
Danelutto, Marco Vanneschi, and Domenico Laforenza, editors,
Proc. of the 10th International Euro-Par Conference, volume 3149 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 417–422. Spinger, 2004.
